平台自营渠道能驱赶销售劣质产品的第三方卖家吗？

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2023.0540

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

电子商务环境下产品质量保证及提升策略是亟待解决的关键问题，零售平台选择优质产品开设自营渠道是提升电商平台产品质量的新举措。本文以两个销售不同质量产品的第三方卖家和一个零售平台组成的供应链为研究对象，探讨了零售平台自营渠道决策及平台与第三方卖家的策略决策互动；通过对当前管理实践的观察，考虑第三方卖家在观测到零售平台建立自营渠道后可选择切换销售渠道，建立了一个零售平台先行的三阶段Stackelberg博弈模型，分析了该博弈的子博弈均衡解。研究发现：当自营成本小于一定阈值时，零售平台开通自营渠道；零售平台的佣金随卖家产品质量的提高而增加，当佣金超过切换成本时，卖家将切换销售渠道；零售平台只可能选择同时保留两个卖家或偏好仅驱赶销售低质量产品卖家的策略，而不会选择仅通过自营渠道向消费者销售产品的策略。

关键词: 零售平台, 自营渠道, 产品质量, 第三方卖家

Abstract:

In recent years， the realm of electronic commerce in China has experienced rapid growth， leveraging the transformative force of platform economics. However， concomitantly， the implementation of complementary regulatory measures has lagged behind. Consequently， issues such as the coexistence of reputable and unscrupulous third-party sellers and the proliferation of counterfeit and substandard products have arisen. An increasing number of retail platforms have embarked on expanding their self-operated channels， characterized by stringent quality control and superior services， to mitigate the prevailing difficulties in product quality management. Nevertheless， this intensifies the competition between self-operated channels and third-party sellers， potentially compelling some third-party sellers to consider shifting their sales channels. It aims to delve into the preference of retail platforms with self-operated channels concerning third-party sellers when contemplating product quality， as well as the sales channel decisions made by these third-party sellers. It endeavors to explore the following questions： What is the strategic equilibrium game involving the transition between self-operated channels and third-party sellers？ And does the establishment of self-operated channels on the platform lead to the expulsion of sellers peddling inferior products？It focuses on a retail platform that has both self-operated channels and incorporates third-party sellers. By constructing a three-stage game model， it investigates the commission decisions of the retail platform in light of product quality and the sales channel choices of third-party sellers. Firstly， the equilibrium profits of third-party sellers are compared given a specific platform commission， thereby identifying the conditions under which third-party sellers opt to switch sales channels. Secondly， assuming the choice made by third-party sellers， the commission pricing decisions of the retail platform are analyzed， by comparing the platform's profits under different commission strategies， and the optimal decision for the platform is determined to expel sellers. Lastly， the impact of the platform's decision to expel third-party sellers， as well as product quality and switching costs， on sales volume and profits for all parties involved is explored.The research findings indicate the following　Firstly， when the cost of self-operation is below a certain threshold， the retail platform will establish self-operated channels. Furthermore， the platform's commission increases as the quality of sellers' products improves， and when the commission exceeds the switching cost， sellers will transition to alternative sales channels. Secondly， the retail platform is only inclined to retain both sellers or solely expel sellers peddling low-quality products； it does not favor expelling all sellers and solely relying on self-operated channels to sell products to consumers. Thirdly， for sellers with low product quality and high switching costs， even if the retail platform prefers to retain them， their sales volume on the platform will be zero.

Key words: retail platform, self-operated channel, product quality, third-party seller

中图分类号:

C931

章琦,陈敬贤,梁樑. 平台自营渠道能驱赶销售劣质产品的第三方卖家吗？[J]. 中国管理科学, 2026, 34(1): 167-177.

Qi Zhang,Jingxian Chen,Liang Liang. Can the Platform's Self-operated Channels Drive Away Third-Party Sellers Who Sell Inferior Products?[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2026, 34(1): 167-177.

图/表 4

表1

卖家L和卖家H的利润"

		卖家H
		$R ¯$	$R$
卖家L	$R ¯$	$Π L R ¯ R ¯ = [α (1 + f + c) - 3 f] 2 4 (3 - α) 2 α$	$Π L R ¯ R = [α (1 + c + t 2) - 3 f] 2 4 (3 - α) 2 α$
	$R ¯$	$Π H R ¯ R ¯ = [2 - 3 f + 2 c - α (1 - f + c)] 2 4 (3 - α) 2$	$Π H R ¯ R = [2 (1 + c) + f - (1 + c) α - (4 - α) t 2] 2 4 (3 - α) 2$
	$R$	$Π L R R ¯ = [α (1 + f + c) - 3 t 1] 2 4 (3 - α) 2 α$	$Π L R R = [α (1 + c) - 3 t 1 + α t 2] 2 4 (3 - α) 2 α$
	$R$	$Π H R R ¯ = [(2 - α) (1 - f + c) - 2 f + t 1] 2 4 (3 - α) 2$	$Π H R R = [(2 - α) (1 + c) + t 1 - (4 - α) t 2] 2 4 (3 - α) 2$

表1

图1

图2

图3

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