考虑交易模式和渠道权力结构的E-闭环供应链定价决策研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2023.1578

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

考虑由制造商、销售和回收平台组成的E-闭环供应链（E-CLSC），在碳交易机制下，通过构建博弈模型，比较分析了不同的交易模式和渠道权力结构对供应链最优定价决策的影响，并通过数值分析进行验证。研究发现：（1）碳交易机制的实施对控制碳排放成效显著，但供应链成员也应注意碳价格的波动对定价与服务决策的影响，因为碳价格的上涨会导致零售价和回收价格的提升，对服务决策的影响则与交易模式和渠道权力结构密切相关。（2）E-CLSC最优定价与服务决策因交易模式和渠道权力结构的不同而存在差异，在自营模式中，Nash博弈型供应链具有最低的零售价、最高的回收价格和最高的正逆向渠道服务水平；而在代理模式中，平台主导型供应链具有最低的零售价、最高的回收价格和最低的正逆向渠道服务水平。（3）从经济视角来看，供应链主导者往往能给自身带来更多的收益，交易模式的选择则取决于佣金的高低。（4）从环境视角来看，具有最低碳排放量的主导型供应链在自营模式和代理模式中也有显著不同。

关键词: E-闭环供应链, 碳交易, 平台服务, 渠道权力结构

Abstract:

With the development of mobile Internet technology and the popularization of e-commerce， more and more manufacturers choose to cooperate with online platforms to carry out sales and recycling business， thus forming an E-Closed Loop Supply Chain （E-CLSC）. However， in the process of cooperation between manufacturers and platforms， the diversity and complexity of transaction modes and channel power structures have an important impact on the pricing decisions of the supply chain. Meanwhile， with the wide application of carbon trading mechanism， it is also important to deeply analyze the role of carbon trading mechanism on E-CLSC.In view of this， both sales and recycling services are considered as endogenous variables in the context of the carbon trading mechanism， two transaction modes and three channel power structures are considered， six game models are constructed and the equilibrium results are derived by solving them respectively. Firstly， the role of carbon trading mechanism is analyzed in depth， then the equilibrium results concerning different channel power structures are compared and analyzed， and finally the two trading models are discussed through a set of numerical values.The results show that （1） the implementation of carbon trading mechanism is effective in controlling carbon emissions， but supply chain members should also pay attention to the impact of carbon price fluctuations on pricing and service decisions， specifically， the increase in carbon price will lead to an increase in retail and recycling prices， and the impact on the level of service is closely related to the transaction modes and the power structure of the channel. （2） E-CLSC optimal pricing and service decisions are significantly affected by differences in transaction modes and channel power structures. In the self-operated model， the Nash gaming supply chain has the lowest retail price， the highest recycling price， and the highest forward and reverse channel service level； while in the agency model， the platform-dominated supply chain has the lowest retail price， the highest recycling price， and the lowest forward and reverse channel service level. （3） From an economic point of view， members themselves tend to bring more revenue to themselves when they act as dominant players， and the choice of transaction mode depends on the level of commission. （4） From an environmental point of view， the dominant supply chain with the lowest carbon emissions is significantly affected by differences in transaction modes.

Key words: electronic closed-loop supply chain, carbon trading, platform services, channel power structure

中图分类号:

F275

张福安,张宏鑫,达庆利. 考虑交易模式和渠道权力结构的E-闭环供应链定价决策研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2025, 33(12): 294-305.

Fuan Zhang,Hongxin Zhang,Qingli Da. E-Closed-Loop Supply Chain Decision Making Considering Trading Modes and Power Structures[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2025, 33(12): 294-305.

图/表 7

图1

表1

符号及含义说明"

符号	含义说明
$a$	潜在市场需求
$b$	销售价格敏感系数
$γ$	销售服务敏感系数
$λ$	回收价格敏感系数
$η$	回收服务敏感系数
$c$	单位新产品的生产成本
$c r$	单位再制造产品的生产成本
$e n$	单位新产品的碳排放量
$e r$	单位再制造产品的碳排放量
$E$	碳配额
$p e$	单位碳交易价格
$G$	供应链碳排放量
$ρ$	基于销售价格的佣金率
$ρ 2$	回收佣金
$t$	表示通过再制造节约的单位成本
$e 0$	表示通过再制造节约的单位碳排放量
$π$	供应链成员的利润函数
决策变量
$w$	批发价
$p$	销售价格
$s$	销售服务水平
$p r$	回收价格
$s r$	回收服务水平
$h$	单位转移价格

表1

表2

自营模式中不同模型的均衡结果"

变量	$W - M$ 模型（1）	$W - N$ 模型（2）	$W - P$ 模型（3）
$w$	$w W - M = a + b A 0 2 b$	$w W - N = a k 1 + A 0 (2 b k 1 - γ 2) 3 b k 1 - γ 2$	$w W - P = a k 1 + A 0 (3 b k 1 - γ 2) 4 b k 1 - γ 2$
$h$	$h W - M = A 1 2$	$h W - N = A 1 (η 2 - 2 k 2 λ) η 2 - 3 k 2 λ$	$h W - P = A 1 (η 2 - 3 k 2 λ) η 2 - 4 k 2 λ$
$p$	$p W - M = b A 0 A 2 + a (2 b k 1 - A 2) 2 b (b k 1 - A 2)$	$p W - N = 2 a k 1 + A 0 A 2 3 b k 1 - γ 2$	$p W - P = 3 a k 1 + A 0 A 2 4 b k 1 - γ 2$
$p r$	$p r W - M = A 3 (η 2 - k 2 λ) 2 (η 2 - 2 k 2 λ)$	$p r W - N = A 3 (η 2 - k 2 λ) η 2 - 3 k 2 λ$	$p r W - P = A 3 (η 2 - k 2 λ) η 2 - 4 k 2 λ$
$s$	$s W - M = (a - b A 0) γ 4 b k 1 - 2 γ 2$	$s W - N = (a - b A 0) γ 3 b k 1 - γ 2$	$s W - P = (a - b A 0) γ 4 b k 1 - γ 2$
$s r$	$s r W - M = - A 3 η λ 2 (η 2 - 2 k 2 λ)$	$s r W - N = - A 3 η λ η 2 - 3 k 2 λ$	$s r W - P = - A 3 η λ η 2 - 4 k 2 λ$
$D$	$D W - M = b k 1 (a - b A 0) 4 b k 1 - 2 γ 2$	$D W - N = b k 1 (a - b A 0) 3 b k 1 - γ 2$	$D W - P = b k 1 (a - b A 0) 4 b k 1 - γ 2$
$τ$	$τ W - M = k 2 A 1 (2 b k 1 - γ 2) λ 2 b k 1 (b A 0 - a) (η 2 - 2 k 2 λ)$	$τ W - N = k 2 A 1 (3 b k 1 - γ 2) λ 2 b k 1 (b A 0 - a) (η 2 - 3 k 2 λ)$	$τ W - P = k 2 A 1 (4 b k 1 - γ 2) λ 2 b k 1 (b A 0 - a) (η 2 - 4 k 2 λ)$

表2

表3

代理模式中不同模型的均衡结果"

变量	$D - M$ 模型（1）	$D - N$ 模型（2）	$D - P$ 模型（3）
$p$	$p D - M = (a B 1 + b c) k 1 - c γ 2 ρ 2 B 0 B 1$ $+ p e e n B 0 2 B 0 B 1$	$p D - N = k 1 (a B 1 + b c + b p e e n) B 1 (b k 1 + B 0)$	$p D - P = 2 k 1 (a B 1 + b c) - c γ 2 ρ 2 B 1 (b k 1 + B 0)$ $+ p e e n (b k 1 + B 0) 2 B 1 (b k 1 + B 0)$
$p r$	$p r D - M = k 2 λ (B 2 + p e e 0) - η 2 ρ 2 2 k 2 λ$	$p r D - N = k 2 λ (B 2 + p e e 0) - η 2 ρ 2 2 k 2 λ$	$p r D - P = 14 (2 B 2 - η 2 ρ 2 k 2 λ + 2 p e e 0)$
$s$	$s D - M = γ ρ (a (B 1 + b c) k 1 2 k 1 B 0 B 1$ $- c γ 2 ρ + p e B 0 e n) 2 k 1 B 0 B 1$	$s D - N = γ ρ (a B 1 + b c + b p e e n) B 1 (b k 1 + B 0)$	$s D - P = a γ ρ 2 b k 1 - γ 2 ρ$
$s r$	$s r D - M = η ρ 2 k 2$	$s r D - N = η ρ 2 k 2$	$s r D - P = η ρ 2 2 k 2$
$D$	$D D - M = B 0 (c + p e e n) - a k 1 B 1 - 2 k 1 B 1$	$D D - N = b (B 0 (c + p e e n) B 1 (b k 1 + B 0)$ $- a k 1 B 1) B 1 (b k 1 + B 0)$	$D D - P = b (2 k 1 (a B 1 - b c) + c γ 2 ρ 2 B 1 (b k 1 + B 0)$ $- p e e n (b k 1 + B 0)) 2 B 1 (b k 1 + B 0)$
$τ$	$τ D - M = B 1 k 1 (k 2 λ (p e e 0 + B 2) k 2 (a k 1 B 1 - A 0 B 0)$ $+ η 2 ρ 2) k 2 (a k 1 B 1 - A 0 B 0)$	$τ D - N = B 1 (b k 1 + B 0) (k 2 λ (B 2 2 b k 2 (a k 1 B 1 - B 0 A 0)$ $+ p e e 0) + η 2 ρ 2) 2 b k 2 (a k 1 B 1 - B 0 A 0)$	$τ D - P = B 1 (b k 1 + B 0) (2 k 2 λ (B 2 + p e e 0) + η 2 ρ 2) 2 b k 2 (2 k 1 (a B 1 - b c) + c γ 2 ρ - p e (b k 1 + B 0) e n)$

表3

图2

图3

图4

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