国有企业非国有股东经营决策参与权对公司绩效的影响研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2023.1627

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

首先基于国有股东和非国有股东与高管之间的多任务委托-代理关系视角构建数学模型，从理论上揭示非国有股东经营决策参与权对国有企业经济绩效和综合绩效的影响机理；然后，以2010-2019年沪深A股国有上市公司为样本，利用多元面板回归模型和非线性回归模型对理论模型结果进行实证检验。研究结果表明，非国有股东经营决策参与权将对国有企业经济绩效产生正向影响，国有企业综合绩效与非国有股东经营决策参与权之间呈现出倒U型关系。在国有企业混合所有制改革过程中，应该兼顾和协调国有股东与非国有股东的控制权诉求，使不同股东享有与其股权相匹配的经营决策权利。研究结果为进一步优化国有企业所有权结构提供了理论和经验证据。

关键词: 国有企业, 混合所有制改革, 非国有股东, 决策参与权, 公司绩效

Abstract:

Pursuing economic performance is the driving force for the sustainable development of state-owned enterprises （SOEs）. Improving comprehensive performance is the basic requirement of the central and local governments and the general public for SOEs. How to improve the economic and comprehensive performance by optimizing the allocation of non-state-owned shareholders’ decision-making participation right is a key issue that needs to be solved in smoothly promoting the SOEs mixed-ownership reform. Although there have been many research results in the effect factors of SOEs’ performance and the relationship between non-state-owned shareholders' ownership and corporate performance， most of the existing literature use relevant data samples to conduct empirical research on the relationship between non-state-owned shareholders’ decision-making participation right and corporate performance. The theoretical mechanism of non-state-owned shareholders’ decision-making participation right affecting the SOEs’ performance has not been revealed， and the different effects of non-state-owned shareholders’ decision-making participation right on the economic and comprehensive performance of SOEs have not been explained.

Based on the multi-task principal-agent relationship between state-owned and non-state-owned shareholders and executives， a mathematical model is constructed to theoretically reveal the effect mechanism of non-state-owned shareholders’ decision-making participation right on the economic performance and comprehensive performance of SOEs. Then， taking the listed A-share state-owned companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2010 to 2019 as samples， and the non-state-owned shareholders’ decision-making participation right is measured by the proportion of the number of directors， supervisors and senior executives appointed by non-state-owned shareholders to the total number of directors， supervisors and senior executives of SOEs， and the economic performance of SOEs is measured by the return on total assets， and the comprehensive performance of SOEs is measured by a comprehensive index covering economic performance and social performance based on the entropy method， the results of the theoretical model are empirically tested by using multiple panel regression model and nonlinear regression model. The following main results are obtained. The non-state-owned shareholders’ decision-making participation right would positively affect the SOEs’ economic performance. There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between SOEs’ comprehensive performance and the non-state-owned shareholders’ decision-making participation right. The findings of this study provide theoretical and empirical evidence for further optimizing the SOEs control rights structure and smoothly promoting the SOEs mixed-ownership reform.

Based on the above theoretical and empirical research results， combined with the operation practice of Chinese SOEs and the goal of mixed-ownership reform， the following policy suggestions are put forward. First， in the process of SOEs mixed-ownership reform， we should not only pay attention to the optimization of the equity structure but also emphasize the sharing of control rights between state-owned and non-state-owned shareholders. It is necessary to promote the transformation of Chinese SOEs from the "formal" mixed-ownership reform dominated by mixed equity to the "substantial" mixed-ownership reform with equity mixing and control rights coordination by optimizing the equity structure and control rights structure at the same time. Second， while emphasizing the non-state-owned shareholders’ decision-making participation right， should be not ignored the decision-making participation right enjoyed by state-owned shareholders in SOEs. The state-owned and non-state-owned shareholders’ claim for control rights should be considered and coordinated. The non-state-owned shareholders’ decision-making participation right should be kept at an appropriate level. Different shareholders should enjoy decision-making participation right that matches their equity. The sustainable development of China's SOEs is ensured by forming a stable equilibrium state of control rights.

Key words: state-owned enterprises, mixed-ownership reform, non-state-owned shareholders, decision-making participation right, corporate performance

中图分类号:

F271

陈其安,许媛,唐书香. 国有企业非国有股东经营决策参与权对公司绩效的影响研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2025, 33(2): 332-346.

Qi’an Chen,Yuan Xu,Shuxiang Tang. Research on Effect of Non-state-owned Shareholders' Decision-making Participation Right on Corporate Performance in State-owned Enterprises[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2025, 33(2): 332-346.

图/表 8

表1

表2

表3

表4

表5

表6

表7

表8

参考文献 44

1	Regier M. Does longer duration of executive compensation foster investment efficiency？［J］. European Accounting Review， 2023， 32（2）： 513-546.
2	李连伟，纪骁鹏，吕镯，等.股权激励计划对国有企业创新的影响研究［J］. 科研管理， 2024， 45（9）： 175-183.
	Li L W， Ji X P， Lv Z， et al. Research on the impact of equity incentive plan on promoting innovation of state-owned enterprises［J］. Science Research Management， 2024， 45（9）： 175-183.
3	Nyberg A J， Fulmer I S， Gerhart B， et al. Agency theory revisited： CEO return and shareholder interest alignment［J］. Academy of Management Journal， 2010， 53（5）： 1029-1049.
4	Lu Z F， Zhu J G. Tracing back to the source： Understanding the corporate governance of boards of directors in Chinese SOEs［J］. China Journal of Accounting Research， 2020， 13（2）： 129-145.
5	姚伟峰. 独立董事制度真的有效吗？——基于上市公司行业数据的实证研究［J］. 管理评论， 2011， 23（10）： 31-35.
	Yao W F. Is the system of independent directors necessarily efficient？An empirical analysis based on the business data from listed companies［J］. Management Review， 2011， 23（10）： 31-35.
6	饶育蕾，王建新. CEO过度自信、董事会结构与公司业绩的实证研究［J］. 管理科学， 2010， 23（5）： 2-13.
	Rao Y L， Wang J X. CEO overconfidence， board structure and firm performance［J］. Journal of Management Science， 2010， 23（5）： 2-13.
7	任广乾，徐瑞，李维安，等. 混合所有制改革中政府激励行为与非国有资本策略选择的主观博弈分析［J］. 中国管理科学， 2021， 29（4）： 93-103.
	Ren G Q， Xu R， Li W A， et al. The subjective game analysis of government incentive behavior and non-state capital strategic choice in mixed ownership reform［J］. Chinese Journal of Management Science， 2021， 29（4）： 93-103.
8	马新啸，汤泰劼，郑国坚. 非国有股东治理与国有企业雇员激励——基于混合所有制改革的视角［J］.管理科学学报， 2022， 25（12）： 51-76.
	Ma X X， Tang T J， Zheng G J. Non-state shareholders’ governance and employee incentive in SOEs： From the perspective of mixed ownership reform［J］. Journal of Management Sciences in China， 2022， 25（12）： 51-76.
9	王运陈，左年政，谢璇. 混合所有制改革如何提高国有企业竞争力？［J］. 经济与管理研究， 2020， 41（4）： 49-61.
	Wang Y C， Zuo N Z， Xie X. How can the mixed ownership reform improve the competitiveness of SOEs？［J］. Research on Economics and Management， 2020， 41（4）： 49-61.
10	Tan Y X， Tian X， Zhang X D， et al. The real effect of partial privatization on corporate innovation： Evidence from China's split share structure reform［J］. Journal of Corporate Finance， 2020， 64： 101661.
11	叶光亮，王世强，陈逸豪. 混合所有制改革与最优专利授权——基于不对称信息的寡头博弈［J］. 管理科学学报， 2019， 22（11）： 54-68.
	Ye G L， Wang S Q， Chen Y H. Mixed-ownership reform and optimal licensing： Oligopoly game with information asymmetry［J］. Journal of Management Sciences in China， 2019， 22（11）： 54-68.
12	Hu Y Y， Zhu Y H， Tucker J， et al. Ownership influence and CSR disclosure in China［J］. Accounting Research Journal， 2018， 31（1）： 8-21.
13	张辉，黄昊，闫强明. 混合所有制改革、政策性负担与国有企业绩效——基于1999—2007年工业企业数据库的实证研究［J］. 经济学家， 2016（9）： 32-41.
	Zhang H， Huang H， Yan Q M. Mixed ownership reform， policy burden and state-owned enterprise performance：Based on industrial enterprises database from 1999-2007［J］. Economist， 2016（9）： 32-41.
14	乔翠霞，马一森，刘韵致. 非国有股东治理与国有企业创新：倒U型关系及其形成机理检验［J］. 改革， 2023（2）： 118-138.
	Qiao C X， Ma Y S， Liu Y Z. Governance of non-state shareholders and innovation of state-owned enterprises： An inverted U-shaped relationship and its formation mechanism test［J］.Reform，2023（2）： 118-138.
15	陈其安，张国宏，赵旭. 混合所有制改革背景下的国有企业所有权结构选择：基于公益性职能的视角［J］. 中国管理科学， 2023， 31（7）： 38-49.
	Chen Q A， Zhang G H， Zhao X. The choice on ownership structure of SOEs under the background of mixed ownership reform： Based on the prospective of public welfare functions［J］. Chinese Journal of Management Science， 2023， 31（7）： 38-49.
16	马连福，王丽丽，张琦. 混合所有制的优序选择：市场的逻辑［J］. 中国工业经济， 2015（7）： 5-20.
	Ma L F， Wang L L， Zhang Q. Pecking order of mixed ownership： The logic of market［J］. China Industrial Economics， 2015（7）： 5-20.
17	李文贵，余明桂. 民营化企业的股权结构与企业创新［J］. 管理世界， 2015（4）： 112-125.
	Li W G， Yu M G. Equity structure and enterprise innovation of privatized enterprises［J］. Journal of Management World， 2015（4）： 112-125.
18	逯东，黄丹，杨丹. 国有企业非实际控制人的董事会权力与并购效率［J］.管理世界，2019，35（6）： 119-141.
	Lu D， Huang D， Yang D. The board power of non-actual controllers of state-owned enterprises and the efficiency of mergers and acquisitions［J］. Journal of Management World， 2019， 35（6）： 119-141.
19	Bradshaw M， Liao G M， Ma M. Agency costs and tax planning when the government is a major shareholder［J］. Journal of Accounting and Economics， 2019， 67（2-3）： 255-277.
20	陈良银，黄俊，陈信元. 混合所有制改革提高了国有企业内部薪酬差距吗［J］. 南开管理评论， 2021， 24（5）： 150-162.
	Chen L Y， Huang J， Chen X Y. Will the mixed-ownership reform increase the executive-employee pay gap of SOEs？［J］. Nankai Business Review， 2021， 24（5）： 150-162.
21	蔡贵龙，柳建华，马新啸. 非国有股东治理与国企高管薪酬激励［J］. 管理世界， 2018， 34（5）： 137-149.
	Cai G L， Liu J H， Ma X X. Non-state-owned shareholder governance and executive compensation incentives of SOEs［J］. Journal of Management World， 2018， 34（5）： 137-149.
22	张任之. 非国有股东治理能够抑制国有企业高管腐败吗？［J］. 经济与管理研究， 2019， 40（8）： 129-144.
	Zhang R Z. Can governance of non-state-owned shareholders restrain the executive corruption of state-owned enterprises？［J］. Research on Economics and Management， 2019， 40（8）： 129-144.
23	Chen F Q， Huyghebaert N， Lin S， et al. Do multiple large shareholders reduce agency problems in state-controlled listed firms？ Evidence from China［J］. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal， 2019， 57： 101203.
24	杨兴全，任小毅，杨征. 国企混改优化了多元化经营行为吗？［J］. 会计研究， 2020（4）： 58-75.
	Yang X Q， Rem X Y， Yang Z. Does the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises optimize the diversified behavior？［J］. Accounting Research， 2020（4）： 58-75.
25	曹丰，谷孝颖. 非国有股东治理能够抑制国有企业金融化吗？［J］. 经济管理， 2021， 43（1）： 54-71.
	Cao F， Gu X Y. Can non-state shareholders governance inhibit the financialization of state-owned enterprises？［J］. Business and Management Journal， 2021， 43（1）： 54-71.
26	刘运国，郑巧，蔡贵龙. 非国有股东提高了国有企业的内部控制质量吗？——来自国有上市公司的经验证据［J］. 会计研究， 2016（11）： 61-68+96.
	Liu Y G， Zheng Q， Cai G L. Do non-state-owned shareholders improve the internal control quality in SOEs？An empirical evidence from the listed state-owned enterprises［J］. Accounting Research， 2016（11）： 61-68+96.
27	刘汉民，齐宇，解晓晴. 股权和控制权配置：从对等到非对等的逻辑——基于央属混合所有制上市公司的实证研究［J］. 经济研究， 2018， 53（5）： 175-189.
	Liu H M， Qi Y， Xie X Q. The allocation logic of equity ownership and control rights from equivalence to non-equivalence： An empirical test of listed companies with mixed-ownership under the supervision of SASAC［J］. Economic Research Journal， 2018， 53（5）： 175-189.
28	陈其安，张国宏，赵旭. 混合所有制国有企业公益性职能和所有权结构对经营绩效的影响：理论与实证［JL］. 中国管理科学， 2024， 32（11）：78-91.
	Chen Q A， Zhang G H， Zhao X. The impact of public welfare functions and ownership structure on operating performance in mixed-ownership SOEs： Theoretical and empirical research［J］. Chinese Journal of Management Science， 2024， 32（11）：78-91.
29	陈艳利，戚乃媛. 非国有股东治理与国有企业高质量发展——基于资本配置的视角［J］. 经济与管理研究， 2023， 44（5）： 124-144.
	Chen Y L， Qi N Y. Non-state-owned shareholder governance and high-quality development of state-owned enterprises：A perspective of capital allocation［J］. Research on Economics and Management，2023，44（5）：124-144.
30	Wei F， Zhou L. Multiple large shareholders and corporate environmental protection investment： Evidence from the Chinese listed companies［J］. China Journal of Accounting Research， 2020， 13（4）： 387-404.
31	马新啸，汤泰劼，郑国坚. 非国有股东治理与国有企业的税收规避和纳税贡献——基于混合所有制改革的视角［J］. 管理世界， 2021， 37（6）： 128-141+8.
	Ma X X， Tang T J， Zheng G J. Non-state-owned shareholder governance and tax avoidance and tax contribution of SOEs： Based on the perspective of mixed ownership reform［J］. Journal of Management World， 2021， 37（6）： 128-141+8.
32	Huang D， Lu D， Quan X F， et al. Non-controlling shareholders and innovation： Evidence from Chinese state-owned enterprises［J］. Emerging Markets Finance and Trade， 2023， 59（1）： 39-59.
33	冯璐，张泠然，段志明. 混合所有制改革下的非国有股东治理与国企创新［J］. 中国软科学， 2021（3）： 124-140.
	Feng L， Zhang L R， Duan Z M. The governance of non-state shareholders and enterprise innovation under the reform of mixed-ownership［J］. China Soft Science， 2021（3）： 124-140.
34	李姝，李丹. 非国有股东董事会权力能促进国企创新吗？［J］. 外国经济与管理， 2022， 44（4）： 65-80.
	Li S， Li D. Can the board power of non-state shareholders promote SOE innovation？［J］. Foreign Economics & Management， 2022， 44（4）： 65-80.
35	徐丹丹，李向亮，王婕. 非国有股东治理能促进国有企业绿色技术创新吗？——基于混合所有制改革的实证研究［J］. 管理评论， 2023， 35（9）： 102-115.
	Xu D D， Li X L， Wang J. Can the governance of non-state-owned shareholders promote the green technological innovation of state-owned enterprises？Empirical research based on mixed-ownership reform［J］. Management Review， 2023， 35（9）： 102-115.
36	朱琪，李燕冰，曹文婷. 公平偏好下混改国企双委托人薪酬激励机制研究［J］. 中国管理科学， 2023， 31（10）： 74-84.
	Zhu Q， Li Y B， Cao W T. Research on compensation incentive mechanism of mixed state-owned enterprise's double-principal under fairness preference［J］. Chinese Journal of Management Science，2023，31（10）：74-84.
37	Siqueira K， Sandler T， Cauley J. Common agency and state-owned enterprise reform［J］. China Economic Review， 2009， 20（2）： 208-217.
38	Holmstrom B， Milgrom P. Aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives［J］. Econometrica， 1987， 55（2）： 303-328.
39	Zhang X Q， Yu M Q， Chen G Q. Does mixed-ownership reform improve SOEs' innovation？ Evidence from state ownership［J］. China Economic Review， 2020， 61： 101450.
40	刘柏，卢家锐. “顺应潮流”还是“投机取巧”：企业社会责任的传染机制研究［J］. 南开管理评论，2018，21（4）：182-194.
	Liu B， Lu J R. Follow the trend or the opportunism： A study on the contagion mechanism of corporate social responsibility［J］. Nankai Business Review， 2018， 21（4）： 182-194.
41	熊爱华，张质彬，张涵. 国有企业混合所有制改革对创新绩效影响研究［J］.科研管理，2021，42（6）： 73-83.
	Xiong A H， Zhang Z B， Zhang H. Impact of state-owned enterprise mixed ownership reform on innovation performance［J］.Science Research Management，2021， 42（6）：73-83.
42	郝阳，龚六堂. 国有、民营混合参股与公司绩效改进［J］. 经济研究， 2017， 52（3）： 122-135.
	Hao Y， Gong L T. State and private non-controlling shareholders in SOEs and private firms， and firm performance［J］. Economic Research Journal， 2017， 52（3）： 122-135.
43	冯慧群，郭娜. 非国有股东超额委派董事能否提高会计信息质量？—基于国企混改背景［J］.会计研究，2021（5）：15-31.
	Feng H Q， Guo N. Do directors excessively appointed by non-state-owned shareholders improve the accounting information quality： Evidence from state-owned enterprise mixed reform［J］. Accounting Research， 2021（5）： 15-31.
44	刘春济，高静. 国有企业慈善捐赠的政府行为效应［J］. 经济管理， 2022， 44（3）： 89-107.
	Liu C J， Gao J. The impacts of government intervention on charitable donation of Chinese state-owned enterprises［J］. Business and Management Journal， 2022， 44（3）： 89-107.

变量类型	变量名称	变量符号	变量定义
被解释变量	经济绩效	Roa	净利润/总资产
被解释变量	综合绩效	Rocs	采用熵值法测算的涵盖企业经济绩效和社会绩效的综合指标
解释变量	非国有股东经营决策参与权	Djgnse	非国有股东委派董监高人数占董监高总人数的比例
控制变量	企业规模	Size	企业总资产取对数
	资产负债率	Lev	总负债/总资产
	营业收入增长率	Incgr	（营业收入本年本期金额-营业收入上年同期金额）/（营业收入上年同期金额）
	固定资产比率	Fix	固定资产/总资产
	现金流量比率	Cf	经营活动产生的现金流量净额/总资产
	两职合一	Dual	董事长和总经理两职合一为1，否则为0
	董事会规模	Board	董事会总人数取对数

变量	观测值	均值	标准差	中位数	最小值	最大值
Roa	9372	0.0319	0.0477	0.0287	-0.1556	0.1735
Rocs	9372	0.4152	0.2053	0.3712	0.0301	0.9374
Djgnse	9372	0.0263	0.0643	0.0000	0.0000	0.3529
Size	9372	22.7399	1.3968	22.5849	20.0795	26.8076
Lev	9372	0.5069	0.2011	0.5162	0.0784	0.9197
Incgr	9372	0.1442	0.3786	0.0845	-0.4976	2.4821
Fix	9372	0.2596	0.1953	0.2160	0.0019	0.7743
Cf	9372	0.0448	0.0682	0.0450	-0.1541	0.2305
Dual	9372	0.0941	0.2920	0.0000	0.0000	1.0000
Board	9372	2.2048	0.1949	2.1972	1.6094	2.7081

变量	(1)	(2)	(3)
变量	Roa	Roa	Rocs
Djgnse	0.0382^***	0.0581^***	0.3288^***
Djgnse	(6.32)	(3.64)	(4.67)
Djgnse²		-0.0790	-1.0013^***
Djgnse²		(-1.42)	(-4.13)
Size	0.0077^***	0.0077^***	0.0639^***
Size	(20.69)	(20.72)	(41.52)
Lev	-0.1089^***	-0.1089^***	-0.3012^***
Lev	(-37.54)	(-37.56)	(-28.58)
Incgr	0.0185^***	0.0185^***	0.0318^***
Incgr	(14.94)	(14.91)	(6.63)
Fix	-0.0559^***	-0.0559^***	-0.1622^***
Fix	(-20.97)	(-20.97)	(-14.14)
Cf	0.2393^***	0.2393^***	0.4331^***
Cf	(30.08)	(30.07)	(15.37)
Dual	0.0001	0.0001	0.0053
Dual	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.90)
Board	0.0065^***	0.0064^***	0.0194^**
Board	(3.14)	(3.11)	(2.06)
Constant	-0.1055^***	-0.1059^***	-0.9143^***
Constant	(-11.82)	(-11.85)	(-25.38)
行业	控制	控制	控制
年度	控制	控制	控制
Observations	9372	9372	9372
R-squared	0.400	0.400	0.343

变量	(1)	(2)	(3)
变量	Roa	Roa	Rocs
Dnonsoe	0.0312^***	0.0276^**	0.2261^***
Dnonsoe	(6.66)	(2.27)	(4.21)
Dnonsoe²		0.0117	-0.4929^***
Dnonsoe²		(0.32)	(-3.19)
Constant	-0.1052^***	-0.1051^***	-0.9149^***
Constant	(-11.81)	(-11.77)	(-25.41)
控制变量	控制	控制	控制
行业	控制	控制	控制
年度	控制	控制	控制
Observations	9372	9372	9372
R-squared	0.401	0.401	0.343

变量	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	GAP<0	GAP>0	GAP<0	GAP>0
	Roa	Roa	Rocs	Rocs
Djgnse	0.0344^***	0.0219^*	0.1113^***	-0.1217^**
Djgnse	(3.50)	(1.68)	(2.90)	(-2.05)
Constant	-0.1088^***	-0.0056	-0.9121^***	-1.0346^***
Constant	(-11.90)	(-0.13)	(-24.93)	(-4.64)
控制变量	控制	控制	控制	控制
行业	控制	控制	控制	控制
年度	控制	控制	控制	控制
Observations	8758	614	8758	614
R-squared	0.394	0.499	0.347	0.309