%A CHEN Hong-zhuan, HUANG Xin, WANG Wei-ming %T Stackelberg Optimization for Spare Parts’s Collaborative Innovation of Complex Products Considering Cost Sharing %0 Journal Article %D 2022 %J Chinese Journal of Management Science %R 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.1774 %P 69-76 %V 30 %N 7 %U {http://www.zgglkx.com/CN/abstract/article_17991.shtml} %8 2022-07-20 %X Under the background of the technical upgrading, complex products as a representative of high-end manufacturing industry, to some extent, its industrial technological level represents the technological level of manufacturing industry. In the process of production and development of complex products which are composed of tens of thousands of spare parts, the production innovation of spare parts directly determines the production innovation of complex products, and how to study the production collaboration of spare parts from the perspective of supply chain to achieve the production collaboration of complex products has become a difficulty in the research process. Due to this reason, Based on the collaborative manufacturing mode of complex products, the collaborative innovation of complex product parts is studied under the cost sharing mechanism of the main manufacturer in the incentive of the main manufacturer mechanism, which considers the process innovation and equipment innovation of parts. Firstly, in order to motive the supplier to innovate more actively, the production function of the complex products is constructed in accordance with the degree of technological innovation and assembly innovation which is about the parts and components, meanwhile, the some relevant parameters of innovation degree is designed, then the cost-sharing incentive strategy of the main manufacturer is discussed and a Stackelberg model of collaborative innovation is built which based on the cost-sharing. Secondly, the optimal innovation level of and the optimal cost-sharing ratio of the main manufacturer are studied in the case of cost-sharing and non-sharing. Finally, the simulation results of a aircraft power support system show that the optimal cost-sharing ratio of the main manufacturer is proportional to the process elasticity and assembly elasticity, while the optimal degree of process innovation and assembly innovation are inversely proportional to the process elasticity and assembly elasticity. When the elasticity varies in a certain range, the cost-sharing situation is better than non-sharing situation. When it exceeds the certain range, the optimal choice is on-sharing situation. The innovation degree of parts and components is systematically analyzed under cost-sharing, which will provide a decision basis for long-term incentive cooperation between the supplier and the main manufacturer.