Carbon data quality is the lifeline of carbon trading and holds significant implications in realizing the “dual-carbon” strategy objectives. Consequently， in light of the existing risks associated with regulating carbon data quality under the MRV mechanism， the optimal behavior decision-making empowered by blockchain technology for multiple agents is explored. Initially， the enabling mechanism of blockchain technology on the behavior decisions of multiple agents in the context of carbon data quality supervision is dissected. Subsequently， an evolutionary game theory and method are utilized to construct a mixed-strategy game model involving government regulatory authorities， emission-capping enterprises， and third-party carbon verification agencies. By analyzing the stability of the strategies of the various agents and the equilibrium of the system， the effective conditions for collaborative carbon data quality management with the participation of multiple agents empowered by blockchain are solved. Furthermore， referring to policy documents and typical cases， the impact of key parameters on the behavioral evolution of participants is further explored using numerical simulation methods. The research findings indicate that： （1） The construction of an on-chain supervision system with multiple interactions of different nodes supported by blockchain can effectively alleviate the regulatory problems of carbon data quality. With the widespread adoption of blockchain technology and the strengthening of public environmental awareness， the implementation of blockchain regulatory models by the government is a prerequisite and trend for promoting joint governance by multiple parties. （2） Emission-capping enterprises have a subjective tendency to engage in collusion and speculation with the verification agencies. It is necessary to significantly increase the cost of fraud and the threshold for collusion on the basis of fiscal and tax incentives and on-chain subsidies， in order to effectively regulate the integrity of emission-capping enterprises in reducing emissions. （3） The focus of strategy selection for third-party carbon verification agencies is credit cost， but there exists a "failure interval" for credit cost parameters， which may lead to a game deadlock in system strategy evolution. A robust mechanism of multiple reviews and credit penalties is conducive to the verification institutions actively fulfilling their responsibilities and overcoming this situation. This research can help mitigate the risk of carbon data quality supervision under the MRV mechanism， and provide a valuable reference for the effective guidance of behavioral decision-making among carbon trading-related subjects and the regulation of data quality management within the carbon market.