In the process of the franchise project construction, there are two different forms of cooperation between the government and the private:the full cooperation and the non-full cooperation. Under the full cooperation, the government and the private sector are integrated into a whole body to jointly build projects, and the government shares profits and risks with the private sector. Under the non-full cooperation, the private undertakes the job of investment, financing, construction and management of the project, while the government only has the right to supervise the project, and they do not have its management right. This leads to the differences on the decision objects of the two forms of cooperation. Under the full cooperation, the government and the private have the same goal, namely maximizing the total social welfare of the toll road throughout its life cycle. Hence, a single objective concession period decision model is established. However, under the non-full cooperation, the government only focuses on the social welfare of the project during the transfer period, while the private only focuses on the economic benefits during the franchising period. Based on these, a bi-objective concession period decision making model is built to maximize the private's and the government's benefits. In this paper, there may be some conflicts of interest between the two sides, so the negotiation power is introduced to assess the ability of one side against the other side eroding its benefits. Then, the influence of the private's negotiation power on concession period decision is analyzed. The conclusions are:under the full cooperation, the negotiation power has no influence on the concession period decision, and the concession period is the entire project life; under the non-full cooperation, the private's negotiation power has a positive impact on the length of concession road and the total social welfare which is created by the toll road. Furthermore, when the private's negotiation power is weak, it can prove the bargaining position by raising the profit level of the unit operation cost to extend the concession period, and to gain more benefits.
YAN Xue, XU Yuan, SHENG Zhao-han, WANG Ge, XU Feng
. Concession Period Decision Model of the Traffic Franchise Project Under the Different Forms of Cooperation[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2017
, 25(11)
: 103
-110
.
DOI: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2017.11.011
[1] 王守清, 柯永建. 特许经营项目融资(BOT, PFI和PPP)[M]. 北京:清华大学出版社, 2008.
[2] World Bank. Public-Private-Partners reference guide, Version 1.0[R]. Washington D.C.:World Bank, 2012.
[3] Zhang W R, Wang Shouqing, et al. Risk management of Shanghai's privately financed Yan'an Donglu tunnels[J]. Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management, 1998, 5(4):399-409.
[4] Zhang Xueqing. Win-win concession period determination methodology[J]. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 2009, 135(6):550-558.
[5] Shen L Y, Wu Y Z. Risk concession model for build/operate/transfer contract projects[J]. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 2005, 131(2):211-220.
[6] Yu Chenyun, Lam K C, Yung P. Factors that influence the concession period length for tunnel projects under BOT contracts[J]. Journal of Management in Engineering, 2013, 30(1):108-121.
[7] 赵立力, 谭德庆, 黄庆. BOT项目的可控制风险研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2005,13(5):41-45.
[8] Shen L Y, Li H, Li Q M. Alternative concession model for build operate transfer contract projects[J]. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 2002, 128(4):326-330.
[9] 赵立力, 谭德庆. 基于社会效益的BOT项目特许权期决策分析[J]. 管理工程学报, 2009,(2):125-130.
[10] Ng S T, Xie Jingzhu, Cheung Y K, et al. A simulation model for optimizing the concession period of public-private partnerships schemes[J]. International Journal of Project Management, 2007, 25(8):791-798.
[11] 宋金波, 宋丹荣, 谭崇梅. 垃圾焚烧发电BOT项目特许期决策模型[J]. 中国管理科学, 2013, 21(5):86-93.
[12] 王东波, 宋金波, 戴大双, 等.不确定收益下公路BOT项目特许期决策方法研究[J].预测, 2010, 29(2):58-63.
[13] Niu Baozhuang, Zhang Jie. Price, capacity and concession period decisions of Pareto-efficient BOT contracts with demand uncertainty[J]. Transportation Research Part E:Logistics and Transportation Review, 2013, 53:1-14.
[14] 秦旋. 基于CAPM的BOT项目特许期的计算模型[J]. 管理工程学报, 2005, 19(2):60-63.
[15] Tan Zhijia, Yang Hai. The impact of user heterogeneity on road franchising[J]. Transportation Research Part E:Logistics and Transportation Review, 2012, 48(5):958-975.
[16] 吕萍, 李晴, 宋吟秋, 等. 考虑运营成本的收费公路Pareto有效BOT合同决策[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2015, 35(7):1808-1815.
[17] Tan Zhijia, Tan Wei. Pareto-improving toll adjustment for a build operate transfer toll road project with unknown demand[J]. European Journal of Transport and Infrastructure Research, 2014, 14(1):66-81.
[18] Lv Junnan, Ye Gui, Liu Wei, et al. Alternative model for determining the optimal concession period in managing BOT transportation projects[J]. Journal of Management in Engineering, 2014, 31(4):04014066.
[19] Yu C, Lam K C A decision support system for the determination of concession period length in transportation project under BOT contract[J]. Automation in Construction, 2103, 31:114-127.
[20] 谭志加, 杨海, 陈琼. 收费公路项目Pareto有效BOT合同与政府补贴[J]. 管理科学学报, 2013, 16(3):10-20.
[21] Efficiency Urit. Serving the community by using the private sector:An introductory guide to public private partnerships[R].Hong Kong:Hong Kong Specical Administrative Region Government,2003.
