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The Research on Government Low-carbon Regulation Guiding Enterprise Low-carbon Technology Innovation in Dynamic Game

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  • 1. School of Management Engineering, Anhui Polytechnic University, Wuhu 241000, China;
    2. Postdoctoral Station of Management Science and Engineering, Hefei University of Technology, Hefei 230009, China

Received date: 2015-03-14

  Revised date: 2016-02-06

  Online published: 2017-03-07

Abstract

Low-carbon technology innovation is an important means to solve the high emissions. Firstly, the complex of low-carbon technology innovation system is analyzed. A dynamic timed game model is established and the influence of government decision-making to time characteristics of enterprise low-carbon technology innovation system is analyzed according to game state and game formation mechanism between government and enterprise in different periods and different stages. In this decision-making game which is between governments and enterprises regarding to the behavior of low carbon technology innovation, the object function in certain period is based on current game state and the game result for previous progress. After that, set up the enterprise objective decision-making model under the dynamic game and government objective decision-making model under the dynamic game. The government's low carbon regulation will directly affect the behavior of low carbon technology innovation decisions,this business is to maximize profits for the purpose to organize the production of enterprises. The government goal of low carbon economy and environmental protection responsibility requires a steady increasing of enterprise's sales in certain amount emission per unit, or stable steady decreasing in emission per unit amount of sales. This requires constant low-carbon technology innovation. Finally, the double integration path selection method is given for guiding low-carbon regulation. The application simulation is verified based on the data of some enterprises investigated in Anhui Province. Validation results show that the low-carbon regulation path is reasonable. So that government could establish scientific and suitable policy guiding enterprise low-carbon technology innovation in low carbon environment.

Cite this article

WANG Zhi-guo, LI Lei, YANG Shan-lin, GONG Ben-gang . The Research on Government Low-carbon Regulation Guiding Enterprise Low-carbon Technology Innovation in Dynamic Game[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2016 , 24(12) : 139 -147 . DOI: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2016.12.016

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