Environmental problem has become an international issue. Handling trans-boundary pollution calls for international cooperation, but the developed countries have different understandings in the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities" from that of the developing countries. The game theory is applied to study the optimal control of trans-boundary pollution, based on the control model of pollution flow and pollution stock between asymmetric countries under linear strategies and non-linear strategies. The findings of dynamic differential game indicate: under certain circumstances, pollution stock in the steady state of non-cooperative strategy to control pollution emissions is lower than that of cooperative strategy to control pollution emission.
LIU Li-yuan, SHI Zheng-xu, NING Li-xin
. Optimal Control Model of Trans-boundary Pollution Emissions in Two Asymmetric Countries[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2015
, 23(1)
: 43
-49
.
DOI: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2015.01.006
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