政府激励模式差异、混合所有制改革与国有/非国有资本的策略选择

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2024.0375

Abstract

Abstract:

Over four decades， reform of state-owned enterprises （SOEs） has accumulated significant experience and practices. Summarizing and learning from these experiences is crucial for further reforms. Previous studies have primarily focused on changes in governance structures at the micro-level， highlighting the impacts of state and non-state capital behaviors. However， less attention has been paid to understanding the underlying causes of these impacts. In fact， government incentives play a key role in shaping the strategic decisions of both state and non-state capital.This study examines mixed-ownership reform in SOEs. We developed a dynamic evolutionary game model influenced by different government incentive models to investigate how variations in these incentives affect the strategic choices of state and non-state capital within the reform process. Using Matlab， we conducted numerical simulations to analyze these effects. The findings indicate that when the government takes concrete actions， factors such as costs and equity ratios significantly influence the strategic choices of both state and non-state capital， leading to faster convergence toward joint participation. Conversely， when the government adopts symbolic actions， measures like fiscal subsidies and tax incentives have a more pronounced impact on the strategic choices of non-state capital. These encourage non-state capital to choose participation， thereby promoting the evolution of the game system toward an optimal state.This paper not only expands the theoretical research on SOEs but also deepens our understanding of the behavior patterns and motivations of various stakeholders in mixed-ownership reform. In the future， to deepen SOEs reform at the policy level and promote complementary advantages and common development between state and non-state capital， the government should facilitate the transition of incentive models and adhere to market-oriented reforms. Additionally， it should ensure the effective protection of all types of property rights.

Key words: mixed ownership reform, government incentive model, state capital, non-state capital, evolutionary game

CLC Number:

F270

Weian Li,Ruirui Feng,Guangqian Ren, et al. Differences in Government Incentive Models, Mixed Ownership Reform and Strategic Choice of State /Non-state Capital[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2025, 33(2): 356-368.

Figures/Tables 20

		国有资本
		参与（ $x$ ）	不参与（ $1 - x$ ）
非国有资本	参与（ $y$ ）	$θ R - C 1$	$- I 1$
	参与（ $y$ ）	$β R - C 2$	$- I 2$
	不参与（ $1 - y$ ）	$R 1 - C - I 1$	$0$
	不参与（ $1 - y$ ）	$- I 2$	$0$

序号	均衡解	$t r J$	$d e t J$
1	（0,0）	$(R 1 - C - I 1) - I 2$	$(R 1 - C - I 1) (- I 2)$
2	（0,1）	$θ R - C 1 + I 1 + I 2$	$(θ R - C 1 + I 1) × I 2$
3	（1,0）	$- (R 1 - C - I 1) + (β R - C 2 + I 2)$	$- (R 1 - C - I 1) × (β R - C 2 + I 2)$
4	（1,1）	$- θ R - C 1 + I 1 - (β R - C 2 + I 2)$	$(θ R - C 1 + I 1) × (β R - C 2 + I 2)$
5	$(x, * y *)$	0	$M$

		国有资本
		参与（ $x$ ）	不参与（ $1 - x$ ）
非国有资本	参与（ $y$ ）	$θ R - C 1' + Δ R$	$Δ R - I 1$
	参与（ $y$ ）	$β R - C 2' + Δ R$	$- I 2$
	不参与（ $1 - y$ ）	$R 1 - C' - I 1 + Δ R$	$0$
	不参与（ $1 - y$ ）	$- I 2$	$0$

序号	均衡解	$t r J$	$d e t J$
1	（0,0）	$(R 1 - C' - I 1 + Δ R) - I 2$	$(R 1 - C' - I 1 + Δ R) (- I 2)$
2	（0,1）	$θ R - C 1' + I 1 + I 2$	$(θ R - C 1' + I 1) × I 2$
3	（1,0）	$- (R 1 - C' - I 1 + Δ R) + (β R - C 2' + Δ R + I 2)$	$- (R 1 - C' - I 1 + Δ R) × (β R - C 2' + Δ R + I 2)$
4	（1,1）	$- (θ R - C 1' + I 1) - (β R - C 2' + Δ R + I 2)$	$(θ R - C 1' + I 1) × (β R - C 2' + Δ R + I 2)$
5	$(x, * y *)$	0	$M$

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Differences in Government Incentive Models, Mixed Ownership Reform and Strategic Choice of State /Non-state Capital

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