不同秸秆回收补贴制度下可持续农产品供应链网络均衡

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.2117

Abstract

Abstract:

Currently， the recycling and reuse of waste products in the manufacturing industry has gradually scaled， while the recycling and reuse of crop straws are lagging behind. Straw mulching can realize the reuse of straw resources， solve the environmental pollution caused by straw burning， and reduce the application of chemical fertilizers for agricultural products. To realize the sustainable development of agriculture， governments has formulated some straw recycling subsidy mechanisms to promote straw reuse. However， as an important carrier of agricultural product planting and straw returning， sustainable agricultural product supply chain network system should not only consider the sustainability of the system economy， but also consider the recycling of resources， and also consider improving the greenness of agricultural products to increase social welfare. Therefore， it is necessary to study the equilibrium of sustainable agricultural product supply chain network under different straw recycling subsidy mechanisms， and to explore the optimal straw recycling subsidy system， which is important theoretical and practical significance.In this paper， the equilibrium problem of a sustainable agricultural product supply chain network is explored， which includes farmer cooperatives， retailers， and demand markets. Under the assumption of straw recycling and mulching of farmer cooperatives， the equilibrium model of the whole system considering three recycling subsidy mechanisms including unit recycling subsidy mechanism， regulated recycling subsidy mechanism and progressive recycling subsidy mechanism is established. Then， numerical examples are used to verify and analyze the model. The results show that no matter what recycling subsidy mechanism is taken by the government， the increase in the recycling subsidy level is conducive to improving the trading volume of agricultural products， increasing the efficiency of recycling and mulching of straw， and also conducive to improving the profits of the members and the whole system. Through the comparison of the three subsidy mechanisms， it is concluded that with the increase in the level of recycling subsidies， the progressive recycling subsidy mechanism is more conducive to promoting recycling and mulching of straw， and increasing the profits of retailers. The unit recycling subsidy mechanism is more conducive to the profits of the farmer cooperatives and the whole system， and the progressive recycling subsidy mechanism is second. Particularly， from the perspective of the overall economic， environmentally， and social sustainable development of the system， the progressive recycling subsidy mechanism is better.Finally， according to the research conclusions， some management suggestions are given from the perspective of government and members， which can provide theoretical and practical suggestions for the formulation of government mechanisms and agricultural-related enterprises decisions.

Key words: sustainable agricultural product supply chain network, straw recycling, straw mulching, recycling subsidy mechanism, equilibrium

CLC Number:

F224

Caiquan Duan,Fengmin Yao,Ying Xia, et al. Sustainable Agricultural Product Supply Chain Network Equilibrium under Different Straw Recycling Subsidy Mechanisms[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2025, 33(2): 308-319.

Figures/Tables 11

符号	符号说明
$u$	单位农产品收获时的秸秆产出率， $0 < u < 1$
$a$	单位种子生长过程中所需的肥料施用量
$σ h$	单位秸秆的肥料产出率， $0 < σ h < 1$
$β$	种子转化率， $0 < β < 1$
$ζ$	单位化肥成本， $ζ > 0$
$θ$	合作社m的单位秸秆回收成本， $θ > 0$
$q m h$	合作社m的秸秆回收数量， $Q M H = (q m h) M × 1 ∈ R + M$
$q m r$	合作社m所需的种子数量， $Q M R = (q m r) M × 1 ∈ R + M$
$q m s$	合作社m与零售商s间的农产品交易量， $Q M S = (q m s) M S × 1 ∈ R + M S$
$q s d$	零售商s与需求市场d间的农产品交易量， $Q S D = (q s d) S D × 1 ∈ R + S D$
$p d$	需求市场d对零售商s的农产品需求价格， $P D = (p d) D × 1 ∈ R + D$
$p m s$	合作社m与零售商s的农产品批发价格
$p s d$	零售商s向需求市场d收取的单位农产品价格
$q d (p d)$	需求市场d的农产品需求量
$c m h (q m h)$	合作社m的秸秆制肥成本
$f m (q m r)$	合作社m的种子采购成本
$c m s m (q m s)$	合作社m与零售商s交易中承担的农产品交易成本
$c s d s (q s d)$	零售商s与市场d交易中承担的农产品交易成本
$f s m s (q m s)$	零售商s与合作社m交易中承担的农产品交易成本
$c d s (q s d)$	需求市场d与零售商s交易中承担的交易成本
$h$	秸秆回收率， $0 < h < 1$
$h m$	秸秆还田率， $0 < h m < 1$
$π i$	成员 $i$ 获取的利润， $i = m, s$
$∑ π$	系统整体获取的利润

参数	0	2	4	6	8	10
$q m s *$	3.7361	3.7426	3.7491	3.7557	3.7622	3.7688
$q m h *$	2.9583	2.9648	2.9713	2.9779	2.9844	2.9910
$q s d *$	3.7361	3.7426	3.7491	3.7557	3.7622	3.7688
$π m *$	13.580	19.553	25.552	31.577	37.628	43.706
$π s *$	49.389	49.529	49.669	49.809	49.951	50.092
$∑ π *$	125.94	138.16	150.44	162.77	175.16	187.60
$h *$	0.4399	0.4401	0.4403	0.4405	0.4407	0.4409
$h m *$	0.3167	0.3169	0.3170	0.3172	0.3173	0.3174

参数	$K = 2.0$			$K = 2.5$			$K = 3.0$
$Δ k +$	$Δ k + = 2$	$Δ k + = 3$	$Δ k + = 4$	$Δ k + = 2$	$Δ k + = 3$	$Δ k + = 4$	$Δ k + = 2$	$Δ k + = 3$	$Δ k + = 4$
$q m s *$	3.7663	3.7695	3.7728	3.7722	3.7755	3.7788	3.7781	3.7814	3.7847
$q m h *$	2.9885	2.9917	2.9950	2.9944	2.9977	3.0010	3.0003	3.0036	3.0069
$q s d *$	3.7663	3.7695	3.7728	3.7722	3.7755	3.7788	3.7781	3.7814	3.7847
$π m *$	25.757	26.777	27.803	24.808	25.334	25.867	23.859	23.891	23.930
$π s *$	50.038	50.107	50.180	50.166	50.2368	50.308	50.294	50.365	50.437
$∑ π *$	151.59	153.77	155.97	149.95	151.14	152.35	148.31	148.51	148.73
$h *$	0.4408	0.4409	0.4410	0.4410	0.4411	0.4412	0.4412	0.4413	0.4414
$h m *$	0.3174	0.3175	0.3175	0.3175	0.3176	0.3177	0.3177	0.3177	0.3178

$R i$	$R 1$			$R 2$			$R 3$
$Δ r$	$Δ r = 2$	$Δ r = 3$	$Δ r = 4$	$Δ r = 2$	$Δ r = 3$	$Δ r = 4$	$Δ r = 2$	$Δ r = 3$	$Δ r = 4$
$q m s *$	3.7491	3.7557	3.7622	3.7557	3.7655	3.7754	3.7622	3.7754	3.7886
$q m h *$	2.9713	2.9779	2.9844	2.9779	2.9877	2.9976	2.9844	2.9976	3.0108
$q s d *$	3.7491	3.7557	3.7622	3.7557	3.7655	3.7754	3.7622	3.7754	3.7886
$π m *$	21.552	25.577	29.628	19.577	22.664	25.811	17.628	19.811	22.102
$π s *$	49.669	49.809	49.951	49.809	50.021	50.235	49.951	50.235	50.522
$∑ π *$	142.44	150.77	159.16	138.77	145.37	152.09	135.16	140.09	145.25
$h *$	0.4403	0.4405	0.4407	0.4405	0.4408	0.4411	0.4407	0.4411	0.4415
$h m *$	0.3170	0.3172	0.3173	0.3172	0.3174	0.3176	0.3173	0.3176	0.3179

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Sustainable Agricultural Product Supply Chain Network Equilibrium under Different Straw Recycling Subsidy Mechanisms

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