Abstract:

A three-level supply chain consisting of a supplier， a manufacturer and a retailer is considered， and manufacturers establish dual-channel sales of low-carbon products，and how manufacturers choose the optimal vertical cooperation direction is mainly discussed. With the help of game theory and operation optimization method， taking the product emission reduction as the state variable， two differential game models dominated by manufacturers are constructed ： the vertical upward differential game model of manufacturer selection and supplier cooperation emission reduction and the vertical downward differential game model of manufacturer selection and retailer cooperation emission reduction. Firstly， the optimal equilibrium strategies of supply chain members under different cooperation directions are studied， and then the differences in the optimal trajectory curves of product emission reduction under vertical upward and vertical downward cooperation emission reduction modes are compared and analyzed. In order to intuitively show the conclusions of the solution model， the model is analyzed by numerical analysis. It is found that the optimal trajectory of product emission reduction gradually increases to a stable state whether in vertical upward or downward cooperative emission reduction mode. Compared with manufacturers and suppliers， when manufacturers choose to cooperate with retailers to reduce emissions， manufacturers' efforts and profits are higher， and followers' efforts are more motivated， but manufacturers need to bear more emission reduction costs. In the vertical upward cooperation mode， the cost sharing rate is positively correlated with the carbon trading price， while in the downward cooperation mode， the cost sharing rate shows a U-shaped shape with the increase of the carbon trading price.

Key words: carbon cap and trade policy, dual-channel supply chain, vertical cooperation, dynamic emission reduction