Abstract: Faced with the increasingly prominent ecological and environmental problems, all sectors of society actively promote the development of green supply chain. However, high R&D costs often lead to high sales prices of green products, which in turn hinder the expansion of the green product market. At the same time, in dual-channel green supply chain, channel competition and the decision-making behavior of supply chain members make pricing and green degree decision-making of green products more complex. Therefore, the dual-channel green supply chain composed of one manufacturer and one retailer is taken as the research object, and the retailer’s fairness concerns behavior is considered. A two-stage Stackelberg game model with one manufacturer and one retailer as the main body and a three-stage Stackelberg game model with the government, one manufacturer and one retailer as the main body is established and solved respectively in the two cases of government non-subsidy and government subsidy. Then the effects of the retailer’s fairness concerns on optimal pricing, green degree decision and profits of supply chain members are analyzed. The results show that: when the government does not subsidize, the retailer’s fairness concerns will reduce the wholesale price, sales price and greenness of the product, and reduce the manufacturer’s profit; The profit of the retailer increases and decreases with the increase of its fairness concerns, which is related to the green efficiency of the product. By contrast, when government subsidy is given, the product is greener and the manufacturer and the retailer are more profitable. The enhancement of the retailer’s fairness concerns can increase the profits of the manufacturer and the retailer, but it does not affect the selling price, greenness of the product and social welfare. Based on this, the government subsidy can not only increase the profit of the supply chain, but also coordinate the influence of retailer’s fairness concerns about product pricing and green degree decision-making, and further improve the efficiency of dual-channel green supply chain.

Key words: green supply chain; dual-channel; fairness concerns; government subsidy