Abstract: As the problem of global climate change, the industrial development of CO2 Capture and Storage (CCS) projects attracts extensive attention from governments around the world. The fairness preference makes participants who make decisions pay more attention to the fairness of benefit distribution in cooperation than to their own absolute benefits. In the industrialization operation model of CCS, energy enterprises are in the core position, and their fairness preference will directly affect the success of the model. This paper aims at the fairness preference and the capital constraint of energy enterprises in the process of CCS industrial operation. An evolutionary game model between energy enterprises, CCS operators and banks is constructed. The different fairness preference types on the strategic interaction among the three parties and its sensitivity analysis are presented. Taking Guohua Shenmu Oxygen Enriched Combustion Transformation Project as an example, a simulation analysis is provided. Simulation results are shown as follows. (1) In the absence of fair preference or competitive preference, it is difficult for CCS to effectively promote the industrialization operation, and the competitive preference of participants is even worse for the long-term operation of CCS industrialization projects. (2) In the case of social welfare preference, the higher the preference coefficient, the more conducive to promote the industrialization of CCS project into the Pareto state. (3) The improvement of the participation willingness of banks and CCS operators have a positive impact on the industrial operation of CCS, among which the former has a more significant effect, and the effect is further amplified under the influence of social welfare preference. (4)The high operating cost of CCS technology cooperation among energy enterprises has a negative impact on the industrial development of CCS projects, but the social welfare preference can improve the willingness of energy enterprises to bear the investment cost, so as to reduce this negative impact. Hence, in order to promote the sustainable development project of CCS industrialization, it is very necessary to guide the fair preference of participants, stimulate the enthusiasm of financial institutions to participate, and reduce the operating cost of CCS.

Key words: industrial operation of CCS, fairness preference theory, capital constraint, evolutionary game theory