主管:中国科学院
主办:中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会
   中国科学院科技战略咨询研究院

   

Incentive Strategy of Third-party Warranty Provider for Quality Information of Second-hand Electronic Products

  

  • Received:2020-10-28 Revised:2021-06-01 Published:2021-07-19

Abstract: There is a serious asymmetry in product quality information between retailers and consumers , between retailers and the third-party warranty provider (3WP) in the second-hand electronics market, and due to the dispersion of individual consumer decisions, it is difficult to design effective incentive strategies with them as the main motivation. In response to this problem, based on the analysis of the impact of the authenticity and accuracy of the quality information of second-hand electronic products on the income of the third-party warranty provider, it is considered that the retailer has private information on the quality of product inspection and inspection efforts. Next, with 3WP as the incentive subject, combined with the profit-sharing contract mechanism, a principal-agent model between 3WP and retailers is constructed to encourage retailers to disclose real information about product quality. The study found that by appropriately setting the incentive parameters in the sharing plan, 3WP can play an effective incentive role for the true disclosure of retailer product quality information, thereby promoting the healthy development of the second-hand electronics market. Finally, a numerical example is used to verify the theoretical conclusion.

Key words: second-hand electronic products, quality information, third-party warranty providers, adverse selection, moral hazard