Abstract: Abstract: Strongly supported by government subsidies, third-party logistics companies significantly improve logistics services to attract online orders for the right to speak in e-commerce supply chain. By analyzing cost structure of logistics service providers, we formulate logistics fixed investment cost and variable operation cost, respectively. Three power structure scenarios are considered based on different TPL powers--logistics service provider dominant mode, logistics service provider vice-dominant mode and logistics service provider following mode, to study the impact of power structure on supply chain decision-making. Results reveal that the power structure does have an influence on supply chain decisions in e-commerce logistics outsourcing supply chain. Specifically, the smaller power the third-party logistics service provider has, the greater the logistics service level, market size, manufacturer profit and online retailer profit would be. Besides, wholesale price, retail price, and logistics service provider's profit relationship under different power structures are jointly affected by the logistics investment coefficient and logistics distribution costs. Under certain conditions, the e-commerce logistics outsourcing supply chain reaches Pareto optimal. In addition, decreasing logistics service investment coefficient and increasing logistics service cost coefficient and unit logistics charge can positively enhance the logistics service level, market demand and profits of the manufacturer and e-retailer. Based on sensitivity analysis, the functions of two types of government subsidy incentives are studied so that suggestions can be provided for policy makers and supply chain parties.

Key words: E-commerce supply chain, Third-Party Logistics, Power structures, Stackelberg gaming