食品供应链中质量投入的演化博弈分析

Abstract

Abstract: Food accidents occur frequently and the positive external effect of investment of food quality exits in the food supply chain. Investment decisions of suppliers and manufacturers in food safety are analyzed base on evolutionary game. The results show that the investment strategies of both suppliers and manufacturers are related to the ratio of input-output. When the input-output ratios of both game parties in the food supply chain change, some evolutionarily stable equilibrium is found. If 'free rider’ can gain a lot in the supply chain, suppliers or manufacturers will not like to invest in the food quality. The government will use macro-control to increase the food security level through two kinds of mechanisms. On one hand, it will punish the "free rider" behavior and force the supplier or manufacturer to input quality. On the other hand, it will provide subsidies for the supplier or manufacturer with a relatively small input-output ratio and encourage them to invest in quality.

Key words: food supply chain, investment of food quality, the evolutionary game

CLC Number:

F203
F224.32

XU Min-li, WANG Qiao, OUYANG Lin-han. Investment Decision of Food Supply Chain Quality Based on the Evolutionary Game[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2012, 20(5): 131-141.

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Investment Decision of Food Supply Chain Quality Based on the Evolutionary Game

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