Abstract:

In the post-subsidy era， how to design effective policy tools to achieve the sustainability of new energy vehicle promotion has become an urgent problem. By constructing a game model of government-enterprise-consumer， this paper investigates two kinds of new energy vehicle consumption promotion policies （price discount policy and green tax policy） with heterogeneous consumer demand， and then discusses the optimal promotion policy of new energy vehicle. The results show that： （i） the implementation of price discount and green tax incentive policies can improve the demand of new energy vehicle and the profit level of new energy vehicle manufacturers and has a good promotion effect. （ii） the consumer’s basic demand preference and the green degree of new energy vehicle affect the government’s optimal incentive policy choice. The optimal incentive policy is the green tax policy when the consumers prefer the fuel vehicle and the new energy vehicle is less green； the optimal incentive policy is the price discount policy when the new energy vehicle is more green. When consumers prefer new energy vehicles， the effect of price discount policy is limited， and the optimal incentive policy is green tax policy. （iii） consumer demand heterogeneity affects the implementation of policies and its effects. When the consumer’s basic demand preference is fuel vehicles， the implementation of the policy is stronger， resulting in greater demand， profit and social welfare effects. On the contrary， as consumers become more enthusiastic about new energy vehicles， the government will need less incentive， and the optimal green tax rate and its effects will decline. The conclusion of this paper is of great significance for the promotion of new energy vehicle and the transformation and upgrading of new energy automobile industry in the post-subsidy era.

Key words: green tax, price discount policy, new energy vehicle, consumer preference