Abstract: Implementing corporate social responsibility,including environmental and social responsibilities, is important for sustainable development.Nowadays, corporate social responsibility is no longer just an internal issue within an organization or a company; its impact is extended to the partners of the supply chain. Thus, it is necessary to make a deep study on the socially responsible supply chain management. In this paper, a dyadic manufacturer-retailer supply chain with corporate social responsibility and cap-and-trade scheme is considered when either the retailer or the manufacturer dominates the product market. In the manufacturer-/retailer-led supply chain, the manufacturer produces products and sells them to retailer, then the retailer sells the products to consumers; and all channel members have access to the same information. Meanwhile, the manufacturer exhibits environmental responsibility behavior, that is, it adopts the carbon emission reduction technology under the cap-and-trade scheme; and the retailer exhibits social (welfare) responsibility behavior, that is, it takes the consumer surplus into consideration when setting price. Based on game theory and optimization method, the price and carbon emission reduction decisions of channel members are investigated; and the effects of the retailer's socialresponsibility behavior, the efficiency of investment of carbon emission reduction technology, and the consumer's environmental awareness on firms' decisions and profits (utilities), total consumer surplus, and social welfare are examined. The main results can be obtained as follows:the retail price, carbon emission reduction level, and sales quantity may simultaneously increase with the attentiondegree of retailer's social (welfare) responsibility; for the retailer-led supply chain, the retailer does not always benefit from the increase of the efficiency of investment of carbon emission reduction technology (consumer's environmental awareness); for the manufacturer-led supply chain, the manufacturer and retailer may simultaneously benefit from the increase of the attention degree of retailer's social responsibility, and there may be a first-mover disadvantage for the manufacturer. In short, a new perspective is provided to investigate the price and carbon emission reduction decisions of a socially responsible supply chain, which contributes to behavioral decision theory.

Key words: supply chain management, corporate social responsibility, carbon emission reduction, game theory