Abstract: It is not uncommon for e-commerce platforms to set higher price for frequent customers by using big data. However, because of the hidden nature of the algorithms of e-commerce platforms, the Chinese government has been difficult to supervise the the phenomenon of big data-based price discrimination. So can the EU’s right to data portability control it? In view of the fact that it is a long-term dynamic process for consumers to exercise right to data portability to deal with big data-based price discrimination, an evolutionary game model composed of consumers and e-commerce platforms is considered. First, the evolutionary game model of big data-based price discrimination considering the right of data portability is constructed, the evolutionary stability strategies of consumers and e-commerce platforms are analyzed, and the factors affecting the evolutionary stability strategies of both parties are obtained. Then, based on the evolutionary game model, the stability of the equilibrium point is analyzed, and the conditions of the evolutionary stable equilibrium are obtained. Finally, a numerical simulation analysis is carried out using Matlab software. Research shows that if the proportion of regular customers among platform users is relatively high, and the additional utility gained by regular customers by exercising their data portability rights to the new platform is greater than a certain threshold, granting consumers the data portability rights can curb the phenomenon of big data-based price discrimination. But when the proportion of dissatisfied customers among regular customers is relatively high, the right to data portability by consumers will hinder the improvement of e-commerce platform products or services; the increase in the value of personal data will simultaneously promote e-commerce platforms to exercise price discrimination and consumers to exercise data portability, but the increase in the value of observational data will have a negative impact on consumers' exercise of data portability, and the increase in the value of derivative data will inhibit e-commerce platforms' price discrimination. This paper is of great significance for solving the phenomenon of big data-based price discrimination and enriching research on price discrimination.

Key words: big data-based price discrimination; the right to data portability; data value; evolutionary game