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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2022, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (5): 236-247.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.1126

• Articles • Previous Articles    

Research on the Evolution of Patent Alliance Enterprise Innovation Behavior from the Perspective of Fairness Preference

XIE Gang1, WU Si-yuan1, GUO Ben-hai2, LI Wen-jian1   

  1. 1. School of Management, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang 212013, China;2. College of Economics and Management, China Jiliang University, Hangzhou 310018, China
  • Received:2019-07-31 Revised:2020-06-22 Published:2022-06-01
  • Contact: 谢刚 E-mail:xiegang186@ujs.edu.cn

Abstract: The typical public goods attributes of patents in the patent pool are given by the patent cross-licensing clauses existing within the patent union. Based on the traditional public goods game view, under the guidance of no effective mechanism, the free riders of the alliance members cannot be avoided, and the group’s falling into the public goods dilemma must be caused by the individual’s pursuit of maximizing benefits. However, it has been verified by a large number of public goods experiments that with the repeated game, even if the supply of public goods generally shows a downward trend, voluntary supply of public goods still exists. It pointed out by some scholars that this phenomenon can be mainly explained by the theory of fair preference. Behavioral economics believes that people in reality care not only about their own interests but also those of others. Therefore, The factors that affect the innovation behavior of patent union members are explored from the perspective of fair preference, which provides a way of thinking for solving the problem of free riders within the patent union.

Key words: patent alliance; public goods game; fair preference; joint punishment

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