主管:中国科学院
主办:中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会
   中国科学院科技战略咨询研究院

Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2020, Vol. 28 ›› Issue (4): 207-219.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.0295

• Articles • Previous Articles     Next Articles

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Development Strategies of Government and Game Enterprises under Public Participation

QU Guo-hua1, LIU Xue1, QU Wei-hua2,3, ZHANG Qiang4   

  1. 1. School of Management Science and Engineering, Shanxi University of Finance and Economics, Taiyuan 030006, China;
    2. Institute of Management and Decision, Shanxi University, Taiyuan 030006, China;
    3. School of Economics and Management, Shanxi University, Taiyuan 030006, China;
    4. School of Management and Economics, Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing 100081, China
  • Received:2019-03-06 Revised:2019-07-30 Online:2020-04-20 Published:2020-04-30

Abstract: It is an effective measure to deal with teenagers' addiction to online games and other negative social influences for game enterprises to choose and set up anti-addiction mechanism behavior strategy. Public supervision and government regulation are important guarantees to build a good social atmosphere.Aiming at the problem that more and more teenagers in our country indulge in virtual online games and influence social atmosphere, a three-party evolutionary game model of government, the public,game enterprises is constructed and a replicated dynamic equation is established on the basis of government regulation and public supervision.According to the results of this model, the evolutionary stability strategy under different circumstances of the government,the public and the game enterprises is gotten. Through the method of numerical analysis, the influence of the success rate ofregulation between the government and game enterprises' choice of anti-addiction mechanism is analyzed through the method of numerical analysis.The research shows that the success rate of regulation plays an important role in the strategy selection of game enterprises. Under different circumstances, the government can effectively supervise the game enterprises to adopt different strategies according to the relevant information. From a short-term perspective, no matter what strategy the government adopts, the public and game companies will choose "no supervision" and "no anti-addiction mechanism" in consideration of their own interests. In the long run, in the absence of government supervision, the public and game companies will still take the initiative to choose "supervision" and "set up anti-addiction mechanism".

Key words: game enterprises, anti-addiction mechanism, government regulation, public supervision, evolutionary game

CLC Number: