Abstract: In recent years, the economic benefits driven food adulteration and other food safety incidents happen more and more frequently. Severe food safety issues have become the focus of government and community. However, there are flaws in the single government regulation, social governance, multi-subject joint regulation, which has become the trend of food safety management. Among them, new media as an important power on food safety supervision, the impact of which has been greatly changed compared to the traditional media. Besides the impact has two sides. In this paper, an asymmetric evolutionary game model is constructed. A few parameters are taken into consideration, such as, x₀, which is the influence factor of new media reports, t, which is the probability of correct media coverage and so on. In that way, the influence of new media intervention on the strategic choice and game results between the government supervision agencies and the food business behavior can be studied. After model is constructed, the gain matrix is obtained and the result is obtained by solving the dynamic equation. Then combined the range of x₀, stability analysis is constructed, that is, analyzing possibility of 4 local equilibrium points becoming ESS. In this process, the focus is on the impact of x₀ and t changes on the strategic choice of both sides of the game and its economic significance. Research shows that, new media supervision can effectively restrain the behavior of the food enterprises adulteration, and urge the government due diligence supervision. But if the authenticity of the new media is low, it will not only hinder the effective supervision of the government, but also give opportunity to food enterprises adulteration. Therefore, the government should not only build and develop new media, but also strengthen the standardization and management.

Key words: food safety, newmedia, social governance, third party regulation, evolutionary game