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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2017, Vol. 25 ›› Issue (1): 106-116.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2017.01.012

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How to Achieve Stable Match and Scale Linkage for Transaction between Power and Coal

LIU Ping-kuo1, TAN Zhong-fu2   

  1. 1. College of Economics and Management, Shanghai University of Electric Power, Shanghai 200090, China;
    2. School of Economics and Management, North China Electric Power University, Beijing 102206, China
  • Received:2015-03-13 Revised:2015-12-29 Online:2017-01-20 Published:2017-03-22

Abstract: In China's coal consumption structure, there are more than 33% of industrial coal used for thermal power generation. Coal transaction is not only related to China's economic growth and energy security, but also related to China's low carbon commitments and other climate issues. The existing researches have neglected an important research unit, Transaction, which results in the weak feasibility of the research conclusion and the insufficient implementation of the policy recommendations. By using the theory of transaction cost economics, the technology of agent-based computational economics and the algorithm of two-sided matching, a transaction development model between power and coal is built to analyze the mechanism of stable matches and the dynamic process of scale linkage. First, the property and the governance structure of "coal transaction" are defined theoretically. Second, the deferred choice and refusal algorithm are optimized to design a mechanism suitable for coal transaction with respect to matching. Third, score, potential profitability, intentional trust and elasticity are illustrated for sorting preferences, and Complex Adaptive System is used for boundary selection. Finally, through simulation, we verify the theoretical assumptions, the feasibility of our algorithm and the plausibility of our model are verified. The results show that:(1) Efficiency ensures the efficient supply and output of enterprises, trust' role is next to profit in the choice of partners. (2) When the coal enterprise's score is higher than the power enterprise's, power enterprise will tend to buy coal instead of make it; (3) to control and adjust the scale of coal industry, China should reasonably and moderately eliminate the coal enterprises with backward production capacity, and set some necessary barriers to market access through the power enterprises. The data in our paper is used for the simulation. The source of the initial value of our data is the China Electric Power Enterprises Association and the National Bureau of Statistics of the People's Republic of China. The main contributions of our paper include two aspects:on the one hand, the "transaction" is chosen as the research unit, the more advanced theoretical support and technical methods are exploited to build our model; on the other hand, a corresponding energy transaction mechanism, which would guide the reformation of China's energy system is formed.

Key words: potential profitability, intentional trust, self-adaption, boundary selection

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