为了应对在线定制订单在数量、质量、交货期等方面的需求以及生产线各阶段产出的随机性，生产商可基于阿米巴经营模式设计车间管理机制。将生产线各工序划分为n个相对独立的阿米巴组织，相邻阿米巴进行定价和交易。考虑承诺交货期对产出合格率及总成本的影响，分散决策下，基于产出不足惩罚机制构建包含计划投产量及承诺交货期决策的斯坦伯格博弈模型。集中决策下，基于资源共享机制构建包含n个决策变量的非线性优化模型，通过计算n阶HESSE矩阵的k阶主子式证明最优解的存在性及唯一性。基于惩罚成本及现货市场采购成本共担机制实现针对各个阿米巴的绩效分配及激励。在算例分析的基础主要得出如下结论：随着各阶段投产量的增大，各阿米巴及整体期望利润先上升后下降；给予客户的延期交货价格折扣越大，对于前n-1个阿米巴可能越有利，但对于最后一个阿米巴及整体可能越不利；合格率的波动性越大，各阿米巴及整体期望利润越低。基于阿米巴经营的车间管理机制设计、产出合格率影响因素的考虑、n级供应链的博弈协调等具有理论和实践价值。
Under the background of "Internet +",many manufacturers provide online custom business to increase the sales revenue and improve the competitive ability.In order to cope with the requirements of the customers about the high quality,fast delivery time and the randomness of outputs of each stage about the line,the manufacturer can design the management mechanism for the workshop learning from the model of Amoeba Operation.According to the product process,the workshop is divided into multiple organizations of amoeba that are relatively independent.The adjacent amoebas decide the price of the materials and trade with each other orienting to the market and the orders.When the promised delivery time affects the passing rate and total costs,for the decentralized decision-making,the Stackelberg game model based on the inadequate outputs penalty mechanism is set up including decisions of the input quantities and promised delivery time.For the centralized decision-making,a nonlinear optimization model with multiple decision variables is set up based on mechanism of resources sharing,the existence and uniqueness of the optimal solution is proved by establishing the HESSE matrix.The performance distribution and interests incentive can be realized for all the amoeba organizations based on the mechanism of sharing of punishment and procurement costs.Based on the case study and parameters sensitivity,the main conclusions are as follows. With the increase of input quantities, the profits of the amoebas and the overall workshop first increase and then decline;The price discount for the delayed delivery is greater,the previous amoebas of the line would be more favorable but the last amoeba and the overall workshop would be more unfavorable. The greater the volatility of the passing rate is, the lower the expectd profits for each amoeba and the overall workshop is. The theoretical and practice values of the paper are as follows:the design of management mechanism about the workshop according to the Amoeba Operation; the consideration of the factors influencing the passing rate;the optimization and coordination of the n-level supply chain.
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