从产品安全责任入手，基于批发价格合同，运用博弈论的基本思想，对四种情景中供应链的均衡进行分析："非竞争与非激励协调"、"非竞争与激励协调"、"竞争与非激励协调"和"竞争与激励协调"。结果显示：适度的批发价格合同激励协调措施能够提升制造商履行产品安全责任水平、市场需求量、供应链及其各成员的期望收益，但过度激励会降低市场需求量与分销商的期望收益，进而阻滞供应链总期望收益的增加；竞争将降低市场需求量、供应链及其各成员的期望收益；低度激励时竞争将降低制造商履行产品安全责任水平，高度激励时竞争将提升制造商履行产品安全责任水平；供应链采用批发价格合同激励协调机制能够增强其对外部的竞争能力，但过度竞争将降低制造商履行产品安全责任水平，进而对供应链及其各成员的利益造成损害。研究成果对供应链的产品安全责任管理实践有重要的指导意义。

The problem of product safety responsibility arising from any node enterprise will spread throughout the entire supply chain,which will affect the performance of other related interest entities and the whole supply chain. In order to deal with this challenge problem, supply chain managers must strategically take PSR strategies to affect stakeholders to improve its performance. In this paper, the conflict coordination of supply chain and market share competition are not considered. Only game theory is used to compare and analyze the equilibrium results of the game model of the supply chain in four scenarios based on wholesale price contract:"noncompetitive and non incentives coordination","noncompetitive and incentives coordination", "competition and non incentives coordination" and "competition and incentives coordination". The basic ideas of the study are as follows:First, the basic assumptions of the model are put forward; Secondly, the game model of the supply chain is constructed and solved in four scenarios; Finally, using example simulation to compare and analyze the equilibrium product safety responsibility, equilibrium market demand, equilibrium expected return of the supply chain in four scenarios, and analyzes the influence of the incentives level and the degree of competition to the equilibrium product safety responsibility, equilibrium market demand, and equilibrium expected return.The results show that proper wholesale price incentives coordination can promote manufacture's product safety responsibility level, market demand and the expected revenue of supply chain and its participants. But excessive incentives will reduce market demand and distributor's expected return, and then block the increasing of the total expected revenue of supply chain. Competition will decrease market demand and the expected revenue of supply chain and its participants. Competition will reduce manufacture's product safety responsibility level when low motivation, Competition will enhance manufacture's product safety responsibility level when high motivation.Adopting wholesale price contract incentives coordination, can strengthen competitiveness of supply chain, but excessive competition will reduce manufacture's product safety responsibility level, and thendamage the benefit of supply chain and its participants. The equilibrium results of game model has carried on the example simulation in this paper on the basis of the introduction of Erie and Mengniu competition cases. Research results enrich the decision-making theory of supply chain, which provides a strong theoretical support and method reference for scholars to study the issue of product safety responsibility in the supply chain, and be able to provide an important guide for product safety responsibility management practices in food and drug supply chain.