针对药品供应商在线售药而引发的渠道冲突现象,考虑我国药品限价政策、医疗机构公益性,构建了药品供应商、医疗机构组成的药品供应链在不同渠道策略下理论模型。进而分析限价政策、公益性等因素对均衡的影响,然后提出了药品供应商的最优渠道策略。研究发现:当药品价格受到管制时,降低最高限价有利于增加供应链利润,提高社会整体福利;当药品价格不受管制时,增加医疗机构公益性有利于降低药品价格,提高药品供应链利润和社会福利;当最高限价偏低时,药品供应商在线渠道开辟所引发的与医疗机构间矛盾将不能通过供应链内部协调;而当药品价格不受管制时,二者矛盾不仅可以通过供应链利润内部转移机制协调,而且可以达到药品供应商、医疗机构和患者的三赢。最后,解析了当前我国药品政策,并提出了相应的管理学启示。
In the era of the Internet, the self-medication becomes an important method to keep healthy because of the convenience of consulting and buying pharmaceuticals online. To achieve more market share, pharmaceuticals providers choose to add an online channel to sell pharmaceuticals, which competes with medical institutions. However, medical institutions need to get profits from pharmaceuticals profits for self-development because of the policy named "pharmaceuticals-maintaining-medicine". The addition of online channel leads to the profit decrease of medical institutions, which causes the resistant of medical institutions. To prevent the profit decrease of pharmaceuticals caused by the prescription leakage, some medical institutions adopt "code prescription". Thus, there exists one reality problem which needs to be solved in pharmaceuticals supply chain, namely, how to mitigate the impact of profit decrease of medical institutions when an online channel is added.
Focused on the channel conflict caused by pharmaceuticals providers adding an online channel to sell pharmaceuticals, the price cap policy and public welfare are taken into consideration to establish price decision models in different channel strategies, where the medical institution was the leader and followed by pharmaceuticals providers. Further, the impact of some parameters, including price cap policy and public welfare and self-medication, on the equilibrium results is analyzed. And then, the optimal channel strategies are proposed and the impact of added online channel on traditional pharmaceutical supply chain from the perspective of supply chain and the perspective of public welfare is analyzed, respectively. Finally, the pharmaceutical policy and proposed corresponding managerial insights combined with the analysis result are analyzed.
Firstly,the impact of price cap policy and public welfare of medical institution on the pricing and performance of pharmaceutical supply chain in single channel strategy and dual channel strategy is analyzed respectively. The studies show that, when the price cap is low, the optimal price of medical institution equals to the price cap, while the price of online channel won't be influenced by the price cap. When the pharmaceutical price of medical institutions is regulated, lowering price cap can increase supply chain profit and enhance social welfare. When the price cap of medical institutions isn't regulated, improving public welfare of medical institutions would decrease the pharmaceutical price and increase supply chain profit along with social welfare.
Afterwards, the system performance in the single channel strategy is compared with that in dual channel strategy. The results show that, when the pharmaceutical providers add the online channel, the profit of pharmaceutical providers and consumer surplus will increase while the profit and utility of medical institution will decrease,which causes the resistance of medical institution. Furthermore, it is found, when the price cap is relatively low, the channel conflict between the medical institution and pharmaceutical providers cannot be coordinated. When the price cap is relatively low and the public welfare is high or the price cap is unconstrained, the channel conflict can eliminate by coordination contracts and generate larger social welfare.
Finally, the opportunity and challenge of pharmaceutical providers to add an online channel is evaluated and management enlightenments are put forward correspondingly. The results show that, when the price cap is relatively low, increasing the price cap or abolish the price cap policy is benefit for the development of pharmaceutical dual channel supply chain. When the price cap is relatively high, the resistance of medical institution for the added online channel will be eliminated by designing the appropriate profit transfer contract.
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