近年来平台的兼并行为日益增多，为了分析双边平台在不同兼并结构下的定价问题，构建了一个博弈模型，分别讨论了双边平台在纵向兼并及横向兼并结构下的定价机制，并对不同情形下的均衡解进行了对比分析。另外，考察了网络外部性强度对不同兼并结构下平台定价、市场份额和平台利润的影响。研究发现，互补品提供商对消费者的产品定价在纵向兼并下最低，横向兼并下最高，而平台对消费者的接入价格与网络外部性的的强度相关，当网络外部性强度较小时，平台对消费者的定价纵向兼并下最高，横向兼并下最低；平台在纵向兼并下获得的利润最高，当网络外部性较小时，平台在横向兼并下获得的利润最低；随着网络外部性的增大，平台对消费者的定价和利润升高，而互补品提供商对消费者的定价降低。这些结论为平台企业采取不同的兼并策略提供了重要的理论指导依据。
The merger behavior of platform has been increasing in recent years. The existing research literatures on merger strategy of two-sided markets are still less, and more focused on single-dimensional analysis, that is, vertical merger or horizontal merger analysis. There is no literature that had examined the comparison analysis of pricing strategy of two-sided platform under different merger structures. Considering that, in order to analyze the pricing mechanism problem of two sided platform under different merger structures, this paper constructs a game model, assuming that there are two competing platforms existed in the market and two sided users are single-homing. Based on the model, firstly, it discusses the pricing mechanism of the two-sided platforms under the conditions of no merger, vertical merger and horizontal merger structures. Secondly, the equilibrium solutions obtained by solving the profit maximization problem under different situations are compared and analyzed. Thirdly, the effect of network externality intensity on platform pricing, market share and platform profit under different merger structures is investigated. Research results show that in the aspect of pricing, the complementary products are priced at the lowest level under vertical merger and the highest under horizontal merger, while the users' access fee is related to the intensity of network externality. When network externality intensity is small, the users' access fee is at the highest level under vertical merger and the lowest under horizontal merger; In the aspect of profit, the highest platform profit is obtained under vertical merger. When network externality intensity is small, the platform profit is the lowest under horizontal merger; With the increase of network externalities intensity, the platform profit and the users' access fee are higher, while the price of complementary products for consumers is lower. These conclusions provide an important theoretical basis and referential significant for platform companies to adopt different merger strategies.
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