在同时面临随机产出（random yield）和随机需求的供应链中，引入基于现实应用设计的具有声誉效用机制和信任机制的承诺契约，同时考虑紧急采购，建立多重不确定关系型供应链决策模型。分析该类型集中式供应链（CSC：centralized supply chain）和以Stackelberg博弈为基础的分散式供应链（DSC：decentralized supply chain）的最优供应、采购策略存在性及其条件，应用逆向推导法探讨供需双方的博弈过程；通过绝对和相对指标分析供应链及其成员的绩效；结合理论推导和数值试验对承诺契约参数、供应链及其成员最优策略和期望收益做关于供需不确定性、紧急采购价格的敏感性分析。
With the development of globalization and specialization, modern supply chain becomes leaner but also more fragile than before. Meanwhile, diversification of customer taste makes it much more harder to predict demand. All these together put supply chain in an environment where both supply and demand are uncertain.Moreover, due to the growing uncertainty faced by supply chain and business philosophy changing from "competition" to "competition and cooperation", traditional contract designed for determined environment can no longer function very well.With the observation of all that, relational contract is modeled into supply chain where both supply and demand are uncertain. Thus Stackelberg model is first used to build an two-echelon supply chain consists of one supplier and one retailer, and it's supply and demand uncertainties are described by random yield function and newsvendor model, respectively.Then a relational type commitment contract,in which supplier commits on least-supply quantity q and retailer commits on max-purchase quantity Q is designed.By analyzing the decision-making process about both centralized and decentralized scenario under the above contract, it is found that, for centralized supply chain, there is always an optimal strategy no matter whether Q or q is or are the decision variable respectively or simultaneously. For decentralized supply chain, all optimal strategy share one common threshold w(wholesale price)=p(emergency purchase price). When w>=p, supplier will rely more on emergency purchase, but may lose expected payoff due to lower marginal profit compared to w=p, but his expected payoff will decrease. On the contrary, supplier's expected payoff will increase due to larger order from retailer.What's more interesting is that, counter intuitively, a "p" bigger than "w" won't always hurt in our contract, it can actually improve decentralized supply chain's overall performance, which is important because business competition is shifting from inter-enterprise to inter-supply chain.At last, the parameters in our model are specified by their reality constraints, the numerical analysis shows that our contract can improve the decentralized supply chain's performance to more than 95% of the centralized one's and sensitivity analysis of p, supply and demand uncertainty on contract parameter, optimal strategy and expected payoff are also conducted.Over all, the research of SCM is extended by combining supply and demand uncertainty and relational contract together, and some useful managerial insights are provided for supply chain managers under themuch more uncertain business environment.
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