主管:中国科学院
主办:中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会
   中国科学院科技战略咨询研究院
论文

基于博弈的“外包内做”型制造外包违规控制研究

展开
  • 大连理工大学管理与经济学部, 辽宁 大连 116024

收稿日期: 2014-09-16

  修回日期: 2015-06-19

  网络出版日期: 2016-07-05

基金资助

辽宁省教育厅2014年度科学研究一般项目(W2014275)

A Study on Violation Behavior Control of “Making in Own Factory by Others” Type Manufacturing Outsourcing Based on Game

Expand

Received date: 2014-09-16

  Revised date: 2015-06-19

  Online published: 2016-07-05

摘要

在管理实践中发现,"外包内做"型外包模式已经成为了制造企业的重要生产方式之一,但生产质量问题却日渐突出。本文研究了"外包内做"型制造企业外包中承包方的违规行为控制问题。运用博弈分析方法,分三种情形:违规与罚款、罚款前提下违规与巡检、奖励与罚款前提下违规与巡检,分析了制造企业与劳务承包方关于制造质量的博弈,为解决制造企业生产阶段外包业务的质量控制问题提供了一种新的思路。研究结果表明:(1)除了以往研究者已证明的对违规罚款外,对履约奖励也一样可以有效地减少违规行为,但两者都有一定的适用条件,两者共同运用时,只要V-(1-a)(R+F+I)<0,承包方就会选择履约;(2)巡检仅能减少承包方的违规收益,但并不能改变承包方的违规行为,因此对控制违规意义不大;(3)提高违规被发现的概率,对减少劳务承包方的违规行为具有重要作用。根据研究结果,企业可采取罚款与奖励并用、提高违规被发现的概率、降低违规收益等方法达到对施工质量进行控制的目的。本文的研究将对采取"外包内做"型制造企业的质量管理提供一定的理论基础和实践指导。

本文引用格式

陈占夺, 秦学志 . 基于博弈的“外包内做”型制造外包违规控制研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2016 , 24(6) : 78 -89 . DOI: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2016.06.010

Abstract

The "Making in Own Factory by Others" type manufacturing outsourcing has become one of the important modes of manufacturers in practice. However, the problem of production quality is increasingly serious. In this paper, the controlling question of the violation behavior in manufacturing outsourcing is studied. The game method is used in this study. More deeply, three kinds of game models are discussed: violation and penalty, violation and inspect with penalty, violation and inspect with both penalty and bonus. This provides a new way of thinking for manufacturer who outsourcing its production to others to solving the quality control matter.The results of the study indicate that: (1) In addition to the effectiveness effect of penalty to violation in reducing the violation actions which has been proven by other researchers, we find that reward to the contractor who complies with the rules also can effectively reduce the violation behavior. Of course, both penalty and reward must be applied in certain conditions. If V-(1-a)(R+F+I)<0, then the contractor will select comply with rules, when both reward and penalty are used together. (2) Inspect can reduce the violation benefit of the contractor, but it can not reduce the possibility of violation behavior. So inspect is no notable effect on reducing violation behavior. (3) It has great effect on reduce the violation behavior if the outsourcer can raise the probability to find the violation behavior. According to the study results, the outsourcer can use three methods to control the manufacture quality: to use penalty and bonus together, or raise the probability to find the violation behavior, or reduce the violation benefit. Theoretical basis and practical guidance can be provided to the manufacture quality management of the enterprise who adopts "Making in Own Factory by Others" Type Manufacturing Outsourcing.

参考文献

[1] Lu Yi, Ng T, Tao Zhigang. Outsourcing, product quality, and contract enforcement[J]. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2012, 21(1):1-30.

[2] Nagurney A, Dong Li, Nagurney L. Pharmaceutical supply chain networks with outsourcing under price and quality competition[J]. International Transactions in Operational Research. 2013, 20(6):859-888.

[3] 沙颖,陈圻,郝亚. 关系质量、关系行为与物流外包绩效——基于中国制造企业的实证研究[J]. 管理评论,2015,27(3):185-196.

[4] 但斌,宋寒,张旭梅.合作创新下考虑双边道德风险的研发外包合同[J].研究与发展管理,2010,22(2):89-95.

[5] 宋砚秋,贾传亮,高天辉.复杂产品系统合作创新契约模型有效性研究[J].中国管理科学,2011,19(2):155-160.

[6] Buchler K, Holcomb S. Modeling and analysis of information systems outsourcing based on agent systems[J]. International Journal of Mathematics and Computers in Simulation, 2011, 4(4):154-161.

[7] Baiman S,Fischer PE,Rajan MV. Information, contracting, and quality costs[J]. Management Science,2000,46(6):776-789.

[8] Baiman S,Fischer PE,Rajan MV. Performance measurement and design in supply chains[J]. Management Science,2001,47(1):173-178.

[9] 刘克宁,宋华明. 不对称信息下创新产品研发外包的甄别契约设计[J]. 中国管理科学,2014,22(10):52-58.

[10] 姚靠华,蒋艳辉.战略性服务外包合作伙伴懈怠风险分析与控制[J]. 求索,2011,(8):40-42.

[11] 李丽君,黄小原,庄新田. 双边道德风险条件下供应链的质量控制策略[J]. 管理科学学报,2005,8(1):42-47.

[12] 田厚平,刘长贤,刘书款.制造业务外包中的质量与交货期联合决策问题研究[J].管理工程学报,2010.24(4):161-166.

[13] Hwang I. Vendor certification and appraisal:Implications for supplier quality[J]. Management Science, 2006, 52(10):1472-1482.

[14] Montgomery D C. Introduction to statistical quality control[M]. 5th ed. Hoboken, New Jersey:John Wiley Sons, 2005.

[15] Reyniers D J. Tapiero C S. Consumers risk and quality control in a collaborative supply chain[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2007, 182(2):683-694.

[16] Friedman D. Evolutionary Games in Economics[J]. Econometric, 1991, 59:637-666.

[17] 谢识予. 经济博弈论[M].3版.上海:复旦大学出版社, 2014.
文章导航

/