本文研究独立公路、铁路运输企业开展联合运输,独立制定运输计划,合理分配运能的协作问题。由于成本结构的不同,分散决策时,不同类型的分运人决策有Pareto改进的余地。考虑到需求的不确定性,运用博弈理论构建了两区段分运人企业衔接式联运的纵向博弈模型。结合集中一体化决策,分别分析了有第三方惩罚控制和无第三方惩罚控制时,分散决策的冲突行为及其变化特征。研究显示通过合理惩罚参数P_I^o和P_II^u的设计,可以使分散决策中的两企业的能力达到集中决策的效果,两企业的行为得到协调。论文进一步对惩罚机制的合理适用范围进行了探讨,发现对于分运人I,制定过高的惩罚反而会降低整体系统的最终能力。而对于分运人II,制定较高的惩罚则有助于抑制其运能供给不足的行为。最后,通过算例分析验证了相关结论的正确性。

Intermodal freight transport is the movement of goods in one and the same loading unit or vehicle by successive modes of transport without handling of the goods themselves when hanging modes. During the whole intermodal operation process, the multi-side participation is an outstanding feature, and how to Coordination behaviors among the multi-actor's is a core problem, which has been considered a challenging issue by many practitioners and researchers. However, it is still in a pre-paradigmatic phase as a new transportation research application field.In this paper, coordination mechanisms are studied through penalty schemes among different carriers which cooperation together to make transport capacity distribute plan in the rail-road intermodal freight transport market. It's assumend that, in a duopoly freight transport market, there are two separate transport firms with complementary transport model cooperation to develop a long haul intermodal freight service. Firm I is the first segment carrier for offering ground transport service and firm II is the second segment carrier for offering rail transport service. Two possible organizational structures, i.e. centralized and decentralized are taken into consideration. In the centralized case—the first best case as a benchmark, wherein two firms jointly decide on the transport capacity distribute plan. In the decentralized case, a Stackelberg game model is formulated. Firm I is the Stackelberg leader with the constraint service level and firm II is the follower. Two firm's behavior strategic is first analyzed without considering the coordination by the penalty scheme in the decentralized system. After considering the different cost structure and opportunistic behaviors for two separate carriers, the solution equilibrium shows it is never optimal for firm II to make more than the demand estimate specified by firm I, therefore, carrier I has overestimate incentive and carrier II has undersupply incentive on transport capacity distribute decision making. In order to coordinate the decisions, the suitable penalty scheme is designed to coordinate two firm's behavior necessarily. Second, based on the decisions which is made in thecentralized system—the first best case and as a benchmark, the coordination is analyzed by setting suitable penalties. This study shows that by setting the suitable penalties one can generate the same result in a decentralized system as that obtained from a centralized system. It is also discussed in details the effective range of penalties to coordinate two firm's decision. The further study shows, It's not necessary to setting higher penalty to the overestimate behavior of carrier I, the penalty for overestimate is in a specific interval which is influenced by parameter K(in effect, that is a bargain power to customer), otherwise, the final transport capacity would be reduced by setting the too higher penalty. The lower bound of penalty for undersupply to carrier II, meanwhile, is also proved. The penalties would facilitate to increase the final intermodal transport capacity. In the end, a numerical example is provided to verify the validity of conclusions, and then some concluding remarks are presented finally.