当前,飞机等复杂装备的研制越来越多的采用主制造商-供应商合作模式。由于复杂装备研制过程的不确定和复杂性,供应商的努力程度在很大程度上决定了产品的研制水平。针对复杂装备研制过程中主制造商与供应商之间的动态交互行为,基于供应商的努力程度,建立了主制造商为主方、供应商为从方的Stackelberg主从合作激励协调博弈模型,研究主制造商最优激励策略设计和供应商最优努力策略选择问题,并进行应用分析。研究结果表明,主制造商通过设计控制最优激励大小,进行利益冲突协调可实现主制造商利益最大化而供应商利益不受损的协调目的,并进一步诱导供应商的最优努力水平。
Nowadays, a new organizational model called "Main manufacturer-Suppliers" model is widely applied in the R&D procedure of complex equipments such as the plane. Due to the uncertainty and complicity in the R&D, the effort of the suppliers has an important effect on the R&D level of the complex equipments. Based on the Game theory, the effort of suppliers was set as a key factor and established the Stackelberg model, in which the main manufacturer acting as a leader and the suppliers as the followers, to analyze the best incentive strategies of main manufacturer and the best effort strategies of suppliers. And the applying of the model set up in the paper was analized. The results show that the main manufacturer can increase its benefit without damaging the interests of suppliers by controlling the incentive policy. This study will provide a valuable guidance for manufacturer to coordinate the efficiency issues ahout the coorpetation of suppliers.
[1] 陈洪转, 何利芳, 方志耕, 等."主制造商-供应商"协同利益主体超冲突均衡设计[J].管理世界, 2012(3):184-185.
[2] Dyer J H, Ouchi W G. Japanese-style partnerships: Giving companies a competitive edge[J]. Sloan Management Review, 1993, 35(1):51-63.
[3] Choi T Y, Hartley J L. An exploration of supplier selection practices across the supply chain [J]. Journal of Operations Management, 1996, 14(4):333-34.
[4] Desiraju R, Moorthy S. Managing a distribution channel under asymmetric information with performance requirements[J].Management Science, 1997, 43(12):1628-1644.
[5] Iyer A, Bergen M E. Quick response in manufacturer- retailer channels [J]. Management Science, 1997, 43(4):559-570.
[6] Kim B. Theory and methodology: Coordinating an innovation in supply chain management [J].European Journal of Operational Research, 1999, 123(2):568-584.
[7] Nagarajan M, Sosic G. Game-theoretic analysis of cooperation among supply chain agents: Review and extensions[J].European Journal of Operational Research, 2008, 187(3):719-745.
[8] Cao Mei, Zhang Qingyu. Supply chain collaboration: Impact on collaborative advantage and firm performance[J].Journal of Operations Management, 2011, 29(3):163-180.
[9] 邱益中.企业组织冲突管理[M].上海:上海财经大学出版社, 1998.
[10] 黄敏镁. 基于演化博弈的供应链协同产品开发合作机制研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2010, 18(6):155-162.
[11] 殷时鑫, 孙绍荣, 顾倩倩.供应链上下游企业合作过程中道德风险的制度契约治理[J].科技与管理, 2013, (2):68-72.
[12] Hirshleifer J.Theanalytics of continuing conflict[J]. Synthese, 1988, 76(2): 201-233 .
[13] Hirshleifer J.The paradox of power [J].Economics and Politics, 1991, 3(03):177-200.
[14] Hirshleifer J.Theorizing about conflict[J].Handbook of Defense Economics, 1995, 1:165-189.
[15] 刘涛雄, 胡鞍钢.冲突行为的经济学分析:一个简单分配冲突均衡模型[J].公共管理评论, 2007(01):24-36.
[16] 田厚平, 郭亚军.主从对策中一类主方激励从方合作的诱导方法[J].东北大学学报(自然科学版), 2004, 25(3):291-294.
[17] 傅强, 曾顺秋.纵向合作广告的微分对策模型研究[J].系统工程理论与实践, 2007, 11(11):26-33.
[18] 李应.供应链多层规划问题及其合作对策协商求解[J].运筹与管理, 2012, 21(4):52-58.
