本文考虑一个由制造商及分散决策零售商构成的两层级供应链,研究了库存转运对供应链各方利润的影响。通过构建博弈模型并推导子博弈完美纳什均衡,确定了制造商及零售商的最优决策水平,并确定供应链各方在库存转运下利润提高和降低的条件。理论分析显示,制造商及零售商利润增减均由转运价格决定,转运价格阈值则受临界分位点水平影响。最后给出了零售商进行库存转运的供应链协调契约。
Transshipment occurs frequently in retailing industry and has a great impact on profits of supply chain firms. In this paper the impact of transshipment on a decentralized supply chain is examined. A game theoretic model is set up; under uniformly distributed demand, the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium is analytically obtained. Specifically, retailers' inventory and the manufacturer's wholesale price at equilibrium is obtained. Then conditions under which a manufacturer and retailers in a decentralized supply chain are better off or worse off from transshipment are shown. Thresholds in the transshipment price such that the manufacturer is indifferent whether retailers tranship or not are calculated. How these thresholds depend on the critical fractile as well as the salvage value of leftover inventory is also shown. Finally, contracts that achieve coordination in a decentralized supply chain where retailers transship are constructed. Results of the paper can help managers in a decentralized supply chain to make decisions on transshipment under various situations.
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