为研究零售商作为Stackelberg领导者的供应链中制造商的成本信息谎报行为对供应链的影响,本文建立了一条由一个共同零售商主导的包含一个拥有双渠道的制造商和一个仅拥有分销渠道的制造商的混合渠道供应链。首先讨论了供应链成员在制造商成本信息不对称情况下的最优定价问题和制造商追求自身利润最大时的最优谎报因子。然后将两制造商均谎报成本信息、其中一个制造商谎报成本信息与完全信息情况作比较,分析谎报策略对供应链的影响,并用算例通过MATLAB进行了仿真。结果表明:制造商为追求自身利润最大化将高报成本信息,且不同制造商的最优谎报因子与交叉价格敏感度和成本的关系不同;不同渠道结构的制造商谎报成本信息会对供应链造成不同的影响,且影响与顾客对商品价格敏感性有关;制造商谎报成本信息在特定情况下对某些成员有利,但对供应链整体始终不利。这些结论可以为混合渠道供应链中的参与者提供决策依据,提高供应链的效益。

With the development of society,an increasing number of supply chains consisting of manufacturers and retailers are dominated by large retailers, among which, some manufacturers begin to open direct channel to sale goods besides the traditional distribution channel. Vertical and horizontal competitions lead to the manufacturers to hide true cost information in pursuit of self-interest maximization. To discuss the misreporting impact on the supply chain, a hybrid channel supply chain is estabished, which is dominated by a common retailer who acts as the leader of Stackelberg game, and contains a manufacturer (Manufacturer 1) in a dual-channel supply chain and a manufacturer (Manufacturer 2) with only a traditional channel. First, the optimal pricing of the supply chain in the situation of cost information asymmetry and the manufacturers' optimal lied factor for the sake of profit maximization are discussed. Then, three misreporting strategies are compared with the situation of complete information respectively to analyze misreporting's impact on supply chain performance, and some conclusions are derived through MATLAB by a numerical example. The conclusions are: (1) Manufacturers will report their cost information higher than the true cost for profit maximization and different manufacturers' optimal lied factors have different relationship with the cross-price sensitivity and cost. (2) If the cross-price sensitivity of the customer is not very high, Manufacturer 1's reporting his cost information higher will reduce his own profit but increase Manufacturer 2's profit. If not, all the participants' profit will decrease. (3) That Manufacturer 2 reports his cost information higher is good for traditional channel of Manufacturer 1, but will hurt his direct channel. That Manufacturer 2 reports his cost information higher is bad for his own profit if the cross-price sensitivity of the customer is not very high, conversely, all the supply chain members will benefit. (4) If the two manufacturers both misreport their cost information, the profits of supply chain members and the whole supply chain will reduce. Furthermore, the bigger one manufacturer's lied factor is, the smaller his profit is and the smaller the whole profit is. Besides, the bigger the cross-price sensitivity of the customer is, the more obvious the change trend is. Theoretical system of the hybrid channel supply chain further and these conclusions can enhance the efficiency of the hybrid channel supply chain and provide decision-making basis for its participants can be improved in this paper.