本文以公司参股银行为视角,在行为金融理论、企业组织理论与信贷融资理论相融合的分析框架下,构建基于异质预期的信贷配置模型,探讨了银行股权关联和银行业竞争影响民营企业融资约束的传导机理。以A股民营企业2006~2013年的数据为例,运用Heckman两阶段回归等方法,我们发现:参股银行和提高银行业竞争性均能显著缓解民营企业的融资约束,参股比例越高该效应越强,且两者在缓解融资约束方面存在替代关系。但进一步的分析显示,银行股权关联对资本配置的影响具有两面性:即银行股权关联所带来的融资优势能够减少因资金短缺导致的投资不足,但代理问题的存在也可能导致银行股权关联被部分异化,使其对于资本配置的正向作用减弱甚至被异化为利益寻租的工具。上述结论既丰富了委托代理理论与公司财务理论的相关研究成果,也有助于我们深入理解银行股权关联的"正面效果"和"负面效果"。
Under the unified analytical frame for the integration of behavioral finance theory、enterprise organization theory and credit rationing theory, the holding of bank ownership is selected as a research perspective and constructs a bank credit allocation model based on the heterogeneous expectations to analysis the impact of bank equity connection and banking competition on the financing constraints of private enterprises. Based on the data collected about A-share private listed companies from 2006 to 2013,the objective of this paper to explore the relationships among bank equity connection, banking competition and the financing constraints of private enterprises by Heckman two-stage model, cash-cash flow sensitivity model etc. It's found that holding bank ownership or improving banking competition can significantly ease the financing constraints of private enterprises, this effect is positively correlated with the shareholding proportion, and their roles are interchangeable in easing financing constraints. However, the further study indicates that the impact of bank equity connection on the capital allocation efficiency of private enterprise is two-fold. On the one hand, the financing advantages of bank equity connection can alleviate the under-investment caused by the shortage of funds. On the other hand, the existence of agency problems may lead to the part alienation of bank equity connection. If so, the positive effect of bank equity connection on the capital allocation efficiency will be weakened and may even reverse. The above findings not only enrich the related research achievement of principal-agent theory and corporate financial theory, but also contribute to a comprehensive and in-depth understanding of the "bright side" and "dark side" of bank equity connection, and provide some theoretical and experimental evidence to the gradual reform of banking industry.
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