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论文

考虑隐性股权的应收账款融资模式下供应链金融博弈分析

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  • 中南大学商学院, 湖南 长沙 410083
王宗润(1973-),男(土家族),湖南长沙人,中南大学商学院副院长,教授,博士生导师,研究方向:供应链金融、金融工程、金融机构风险管理.

收稿日期: 2014-06-03

  修回日期: 2014-12-24

  网络出版日期: 2015-09-28

基金资助

国家自然科学基金资助项目(71371194);国家自然科学基金创新研究群体科学基金资助项目(70921001);教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划资助项目(NCET-11-0524);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(2011JQ025)

Liquidity, Liquidity Risk and Performance——A Empirical Study on Chinese Open-End Mutual Funds

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  • School of Business, Central South University, Changsha 410083, China

Received date: 2014-06-03

  Revised date: 2014-12-24

  Online published: 2015-09-28

摘要

本文研究了隐性股权下供应链金融系统中出现资金缺口的供应商通过应收账款融资的最优策略。将资本资产定价方法(CAPM)与净现值法(NPV)相结合,考虑三者之间的隐性股权,提出了一个由供应商、制造商、银行组成的供应链金融系统,针对是否考虑隐性股权对系统三方的最大收益进行博弈分析,发现在不完全信息博弈达到均衡时,考虑隐性股权的供应商更易以相对较低的融资成本从银行获得信贷。

本文引用格式

王宗润, 田续燃, 陈晓红 . 考虑隐性股权的应收账款融资模式下供应链金融博弈分析[J]. 中国管理科学, 2015 , 23(9) : 1 -8 . DOI: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2015.09.001

Abstract

The focus of this paper is to research the optimal strategies facing cash constraints based on supply chain financing with implicit equity stake. A supply chain financing system composed of a supplier, a manufacturer and a bank is developed. Considering the implicit equity stake among them and using the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and the net present value (NPV) analysis in conjunction with three-part game theory to quantify the value of implicit equity stake and determine the optimal strategies, it is found that suppliers considering implicit equity stake can finance at a lower cost.

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