如何降低供应风险是供应链管理中的热点问题。本文考虑供应商拥有关于初始可靠性的私有信息,且制造商流程改进可提高初始可靠性,运用委托代理理论,研究了制造商流程改进和采购策略联合优化下的最优合同设计。通过对比对称和不对称信息下制造商的最优采购合同,发现信息不对称的存在降低了制造商向低初始可靠性供应商订货的概率,还可能导致过度努力。信息不对称的存在不一定造成社会福利损失,也不一定产生信息租金。当供应商的初始可靠性水平和纳什谈判力满足一定条件时,相比与制造商的最优采购合同,供应商披露私有信息会使供应链实现帕累托改进。最后通过算例验证了模型的结论。本文对供应风险下的采购实践有很好的参考价值和指导意义。
Risk mitigation is a hot topic in supply chain management. We consider a manufacturer faces an unreliable supplier with private information on high or low initial reliability, and the initial reliability can be enhanced through process improvement initiated by the manufacturer. By applying the principle-agent theory, the optimal contracts including both the manufacturer's process improvement and procurement decision are designed. By comparing the manufacturer's optimal contracts under full and asymmetric information, it is found that, information asymmetry decreases the probability that the manufacturer orders from the supplier with low initial reliability, and may lead to over-improvement on him. Information asymmetry does not necessarily decrease social welfare or lead to information rent. When the initial reliabilities and the supplier's Nash bargaining power satisfy some conditions, compared with the manufacturer's optimal procurement contracts, the Pareto improvement of the supply chain can be realized by the supplier's self-revelation of his private information. Numerical examples is used to verify the main conclusions. It is valuable and significant to the procurement activities under supply risk.
[1] Muthukrishnan R, Shulman J A. Understanding supply chain risk: A McKinsey global survey[J].The Mckinsey Quarterly,2006,9:1-9.
[2] Krause D R, Handfield R B, Tyler B B. The relationships between supplier development, commitment, social capital accumulation and performance improvement[J]. Journal of Operations Management, 2007, 25(2): 528-545.
[3] Handfield R B, Krause D R, Scannell T V, et al. Avoid the pitfalls in supplier development[J]. Sloan Management Review, 2000, 41(2): 37-49.
[4] Kim, C R. Toyota aims for quake-proof supply chain[N/OL]. (2011-09-06)http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/06/us-toyota-idUSTRE￣7852￣RF20110￣906.
[5] Babich V, Burnetas A N, Ritchken P H. Competition and diversification effects in supply chains with supplier default risk[J]. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2007, 9(2): 123-146.
[6] Tang S, Kouvelis P. Supplier diversification strategies in the presence of yield uncertainty and buyer competition[J]. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2011, 13(4): 439-451.
[7] Yang Zhibin, Aydin G, Babich V, et al. Supply disruption, asymmetric information, and a backup production option[J]. Management Science, 2009, 55(2): 192-209.
[8] Yang Zhibin, Aydin G, Babich V, et al.Dual-sourcing option under asymmetric information about supplier reliability[J]. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2012, 14(2): 202-217.
[9] Liu Shaoxuan, So K C, Zhang Fuqiang. Effect of supply reliability in a retail setting with joint marketing and inventory decisions[J]. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2010, 12(1): 19-32.
[10] Wang Yimin, Gilland W, Tomlin B. Mitigating supply risk: Dual sourcing or process improvement[J]. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2010, 12(3): 489-510.
[11] Hu Xinxin, Gurnani H, Wang Ling. Managing risk of supply disruptions: Incentives for capacity restoration[J]. Production and Operations Management, 2013, 22(1): 137-150.
[12] Guajardo J, Cohen M A, Kim S H, et al. Impact of performance-based contracting on production reliability: An empirical analysis[J]. Management Science, 2012, 58(5): 961-979.
[13] Bolton P, Dewatripont M. Contract theory[M]. Cambridge: The MIT Press. 2005.
[14] 陈金亮, 宋华, 徐渝. 不对称信息下具有需求预测更新的供应链合同协调研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2010, 18(1): 83-89.
[15] Iyer A V, Schwarz L B, Zenios S A. A principal-agent model for product specification and production[J]. Management Science, 2005, 51(1): 106-119.
[16] Porteus E L. Optimal lot sizing, process quality improvement and setup cost reduction[J]. Operations Research, 1986, 34(1): 137-144.
