考虑副产品入侵的制造商废料处理策略

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.0490

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

考虑单制造商和单废料处理商构成的供应链结构，制造商在生产主产品过程中产生的废料优先销售给下游处理商，经过处理转化的副产品在主产品低端市场销售；剩余废料由制造商通过传统方式自行处理。综合考虑废料销售实现副产品协同所带来处理成本的节约和处理商通过副产品销售对主产品市场的侵入效应，本文研究了制造商的最优废料处理策略和主副产品的最优产量决策。研究结果表明，上游制造商会通过调整废料批发价格实现不同的废料处理策略。当废料批发价格由低到高时，制造商将依次选择“全部出售”“部分出售部分自处理”和“不出售完全自处理”三种策略。制造商废料批发价格和主产品产量策略受到废料处理成本影响，成本增加会导致批发价格上涨，主产品产量先减少后增加最后保持不变。副产品质量影响制造商废料出售意愿，质量越高，出售意愿越大，但是全部出售意愿先减少后增加。此外，通过算例分析可得到，随着质量的提高，制造商利润不会像处理商一样一直增加，由于副产品协同导致的销售利润下降和处理成本下降，制造商利润先减少后增加。

关键词: 副产品协同, 产量决策, 产品竞争, 产品入侵

Abstract:

By-product synergy （BPS） is a new and environmentally friendly way to process wastes in practice. A third-party processor with the BPS technology can help a manufacturer reduce the waste-disposal cost. However， the processor can convert wastes into useful commodities， which may have a weak substitution effect on the manufacturer’s prime product （i.e.， a low-quality substitutable product）. Considering the opposite two effects： the by-product encroachment effect brought by the BPS technology and the manufacturer’s waste-disposal cost reduction effect， a manufacturer’s optimal decisions （i.e.， the prime product’s production quantity and waste-disposal policy） and a downstream processor’s optimal by-product production decision are analyzed.Consider a supply chain comprising an upstream manufacturer and a downstream waste processor. The manufacturer generates wastes in the prime production process. The processor with the BPS technology needs to purchase wastes at a unit wholesale price from the manufacturer and convert them into saleable by-products. The by-product has a lower quality than the prime product and can’t completely substitute the prime product. The interactive decisions between the manufacturer and the processer in a Stackelberg game are analyzed with the manufacturer serving as the leader.Firstly， the manufacturer determines the production quantity of the prime product and the wholesale price of wastes. Then the processor decides the by-product’s production quantity and these products are sold in the market thereafter. A backward induction method is used to solve this problem.The main results are as followings：a） The processor will buy all wastes when the wholesale price is relatively low and withdraw from the market when the wholesale price is relatively high. When the wholesale price is medium， the processor will buy only partial wastes.b） The manufacturer's waste-disposal policy depends on the prime product’s production quantity. When the quantity is relatively low， the manufacturer focuses more on the waste-disposal cost reduction. He will choose to sell all wastes to the processor （strategy F）. When the quantity is relatively high， the manufacturer is willing to mitigate the competition in the market and don’t sell wastes to the processor （strategy N）. However， if the quantity is medium， the manufacturer will sell a part of wastes （strategy P）， which trades off the waste-disposal cost reduction and the competition effect caused by the by-product encroachment. c） The prime product’s production decision depends on the processor’s waste processing cost. When the BPS technology is not mature and the cost is high， the manufacturer doesn’t sell wastes to the processor because he is worried more about the intensive competition brought the by-product encroachment. With the improvement of BPS technology， the manufacturer begins to accept BPS and is willing to use the technology to reduce the cost.Therefore， the proportion of wastes sold to the processor gradually increases. Our research enriches the theory of BPS operations and the findings can help managers to better understand the interactive decisions of decentralized supply chains with the BPS Technology adoption.

Key words: by-product synergy, quantity decision, product competition, encroachment

中图分类号:

F274

金力,徐和,周品. 考虑副产品入侵的制造商废料处理策略[J]. 中国管理科学, 2024, 32(4): 218-226.

Li Jin,He Xu,Pin Zhou. The Manufacturer's Optimal Waste-disposal Policy Considering By-product Encroachment[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2024, 32(4): 218-226.

图/表 9

图1

图2

图3

表1

不同策略下主副产品产量和利润"

条件	$Q 1 *$	$w *$	$Q 2 *$	$Π m *$	$π r *$
$0 ≤ c r ≤ c ? r$	$(1 + q r) R - c r r 2 (1 + 2 q r + 2 q r 2)$	$q R - c r - q 1 + 2 r Q 1 *$	$r Q 1 *$	$[(1 + q r) R - c r r] 2 4 (1 + 2 q r + 2 q r 2)$	$q r 2 Q 1 * 2$
$c ? r ≤ c r ≤ c r ˉ$	$2 - q R + c r - (1 + 2 r) c s 2 (2 - q)$	$12 q R - c r - c s$	$(1 + q r) c s - c r 2 q (2 - q)$	$[2 - q R + c r - (1 + 2 r) c s] 2 8 (2 - q) + (q R - c r + c s) 2 8 q$	$[1 + q r c s - c r] 2 4 q (2 - q) 2$
$c r ≥ c r ˉ$	$R - c s r 2$	$N / A$	0	$(R - c s r) 2 4$	0

表1

图4

图5

图6

图7

图8

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