终极所有权结构对资本结构选择的影响——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文使用中国非金融上市公司截面数据,应用一系列OLS实证检验终极所有权结构对资本结构选择的影响。研究发现,终极所有权结构确实影响资本结构选择。具体而言:(1)现金流量权与债务水平正相关;(2)控制权与债务水平负相关;(3)控制权和现金流量权的分离度与债务水平负相关;(4)控制权超过现金流量权的公司具有显著低的债务水平;(5)终极控制股东是国有公司的债务水平显著低于终极控制股东是民营等非国有的公司;(6)董事会成员中终极控制股东派出的董事越多的公司具有相对多的债务水平。本文提供的经验证据支持这样的论点——在控制权超过现金流量权的情况下,终极控制股东会利用手中的控制权"掏空"上市公司,股权融资偏好和减少债务融资以摆脱对"隧道"行为约束的效应明显。

关键词: 终极所有权结构, 现金流量权, 控制权, 资本结构

Abstract: In this paper, the cross-section data of non-financial listed companies in China is adopted and a series of OLS is applied to empirically test the effect of ultimate ownership structure on the choice of capital structure. The result shows that ultimate ownership structure does affect the choice of capital structure. To be specific: (1)Cash flow rights is positively correlated with debt levels; (2)Control rights is negatively correlated with debt levels; (3)The degree of divergence between control rights and cash flow rights is negatively correlated with debt levels; (4) Firm with more control rights than cash flow rights maintains a significantly low debt levels; (5) Debt levels of the firm whose ultimate controlling shareholder is state-owned enterprise is significantly lower than that of firm whose ultimate controlling shareholder is non-state-owned enterprise like private company; (6) The more board members assigned by the ultimate controlling shareholder of the firm, the higher debt levels of the firm is. There is empirical evidence supporting the argument that in the case that control rights exceeds cash flow rights, the ultimate controlling shareholder is likely to tunnel listed companies through utilizing its control rights, therefore the effect of the preference for equity financing and reducing debt financing so as to shake off the constraints of tunneling behavior is significant.

Key words: ultimate ownership structure, cash flow rights, control rights, capital structure

中图分类号:

F275.1

肖作平. 终极所有权结构对资本结构选择的影响——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J]. 中国管理科学, 2012, (4): 167-176.

Xiao Zuo-ping. The Effects of Ultimate Ownership Structure on the Choice of Capital Structure: Empirical Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2012, (4): 167-176.

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