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主办:中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会
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中国管理科学 ›› 2005, Vol. ›› Issue (3): 115-118.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

基于两维度相对业绩比较的经营者报酬契约设计

徐细雄, 万迪昉, 梁巧转   

  1. 西安交通大学管理学院, 陕西, 西安, 710049
  • 收稿日期:2004-06-09 修回日期:2005-04-13 出版日期:2005-06-28 发布日期:2012-03-07
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目(70371036;70372054)

The Designing of Executive’s Payment Based on Two-Dimension Relative Performance Evaluation

XU Xi-xiong, WAN Di-fang, LIANG Qiao-zhuan   

  1. The School of Management, Xi’an Jiaotong University, Xi’an 710049, China
  • Received:2004-06-09 Revised:2005-04-13 Online:2005-06-28 Published:2012-03-07

摘要: 使代理人采取最优行为的最好办法就是将其报酬和经营业绩挂钩。构建了基于二维度相对业绩比较的经营者报酬契约模型,以剔除经营者不可控的外部系统环境因素和企业内部资源质量给其带来的风险承担,并对该模型进行了简要讨论,从数理上证明了该模型相对传统经营者报酬契约模型具有帕累托效率改进。

关键词: 两维度, 相对业绩评价, 契约, 风险

Abstract: The best way to incentive agents is to bind the compensation with their operative performance.We design an executive’s compensation contract based on two-dimension relative performance evaluation,so as to eliminate risk imposed on executives by external systematic circumstance and resource of enterprise.Then we represent a brief discussion about the model and prove its Pareto-efficiency relative to traditional model.

Key words: two-dimension, relative performance evaluation, contract, risk

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