经理层过度投资与股权激励的契约模型研究

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 为了获得控制权收益,经理层倾向于在有利于维持自身地位的项目上过度投资,从而形成了所谓“固守职位”的现象,这种行为损害了股东的利益。本文建立了一个简单的股东与经理层之间的契约模型,研究了股东如何设计最优契约来降低经理的过度投资问题,并考察了经理层过度投资程度与哪些因素有关。比较静态分析表明投资项目的风险状况通过所有者给予经理层的最优股权比例的变化间接影响过度投资程度;在存在经理人市场的条件下,外部替代的风险会使得这种保护自身职位的过度投资性行为更加突出。

关键词: 过度投资, 委托-代理关系, 激励

Abstract: There exist agent costs because of different targets between shareholders and managers.Managers own private information on investment due to information asymmetry.Managers will over-invest in the specific investment for purpose of entrenchment to realize control benefits,which damages the benefit of shareholders.In this paper we build a simple contract model between shareholders and managers.Shareholders offer part of shares to the managers for effective incentives.After obtaining the perfect share ratio to managers,we discuss the comparative static analysis on perfect share ratio and over-investment when risk attitude of managers,investment risk and ability gap between current managers and alternative managers happen to change.

Key words: over-investment, principal-agent relationship, incentives

中图分类号:

F830.2

王艳, 孙培源, 杨忠直. 经理层过度投资与股权激励的契约模型研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2005, (1): 127-131.

WANG Yan, SUN Pei-yuan, YANG Zhong-zhi. Manager’s Over-Investment and Stock Incentives:A Contract Model[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2005, (1): 127-131.

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