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中国管理科学 ›› 2003, Vol. ›› Issue (3): 83-87.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

商业银行信息披露监控机制的构建研究

彭小兵, 蒲勇健   

  1. 重庆大学经济与工商管理学院 重庆 400044
  • 收稿日期:2002-11-08 修回日期:2003-05-06 出版日期:2003-06-28 发布日期:2012-03-06
  • 基金资助:
    重庆市金融学会2002年招标项目课题资助

Research on Monitoring Mechanism Design of Information Disclosure in Commercial Bank

PENG Xiao-bing, PU Yong-jian   

  1. College of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400044, China
  • Received:2002-11-08 Revised:2003-05-06 Online:2003-06-28 Published:2012-03-06

摘要: 商业银行充分有效的信息披露是进一步完善市场经济机制、强化对银行的市场约束,提高金融透明度的必然要求,也是国际银行监管发展的趋势。运用博弈论与信息经济学的原理,研究商业银行信息披露监控中的一阶段博弈和多阶段的重复博弈问题。根据博弈结果,认为按既定的行为规则下设计信息披露监控机制,可以构成稳定的均衡,博弈的双方都有遵守机制的内在动力。

关键词: 信息披露, 监控, 商业银行, 机制设计

Abstract: Consummating market economy mechanism and strengthening marketable restriction with commercial banks to increase diaphaneity of banking require a sufficient information disclosure in commercial banks,which is a certain tendency of international banking monitoring According as game theory and information economics,the paper researches 1-stage game and T-stages repeated games of information disclosure monitoring in commercial banks,and it is concluded that a stable game equilibrium will be composed and players will obey the mechanism when information disclosure monitoring mechanism is constructed according to established action rules.

Key words: information disclosure, monitoring, commercial banks, mechanism design

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