工程质量优化的承包商群体激励效率演化分析

中国管理科学 ›› 2012, Vol. ›› Issue (3): 112-121.

工程质量优化的承包商群体激励效率演化分析

李真¹, 孟庆峰², 盛昭瀚³, 李迁³

1. 江苏科技大学经济管理学院, 江苏镇江 212003;
2. 江苏大学管理学院, 江苏镇江 212013;
3. 南京大学工程管理学院, 江苏南京 210093

收稿日期:2011-04-03 修回日期:2012-03-21 出版日期:2012-06-29 发布日期:2012-07-05
基金资助:
国家社会科学基金重大项目(11&ZD169);"十一五"国家科技支撑计划重点项目(2011BAG07B05);国家自然科学基金重点项目(70831002);国家自然科学基金项目(70971061,71171099,71101069,71001028,71004049,71101067)

Analysis on Performance and Evolution of Mass Stimulation under Project Quality Optimization

LI Zhen¹, MENG Qing-Feng², SHENG Zhao-han³, LI Qian³

1. School of Economics and Management, Jiangsu University of Science and Technology, Zhenjiang 212003, China;
2. School of Management, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang 212013, China;
3. School of Management and Engineering, Nanjing University, Nanjing 210093, China

Received:2011-04-03 Revised:2012-03-21 Online:2012-06-29 Published:2012-07-05

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 针对业主与多标段承包商群体的一对多结构,考虑业主如何通过单价合同与收益共享合同所组成的菜单合同模式对承包商群体进行激励以优化工程质量。本文构建了单阶段群体激励模型以及考虑承包商个体存在公平感知的多阶段群体激励模型,通过计算实验方法探讨不同报酬结构下的激励效率及其演化。研究表明:业主实行同一报酬结构在多阶段工程建设中难以维持高效率;单阶段激励中较好的报酬结构并不适用于多阶段激励过程;个体的公平感知对激励绩效会产生负面影响;报酬结构中针对不同质量标准的激励力度均会对激励效率产生影响,仅针对单一激励力度进行调整或忽视激励力度间的协同均不能实现较好的激励效果。

关键词: 质量优化, 群体激励, 报酬结构, 计算实验

Abstract: In this paper,one owner and many contractors construction system is studied, in which the owner uses menu contract, including unit price contract and revenue sharing contract, to stimulate contractors on project quality optimization and coordination. Two basic models are built up, one is single-stage incentive model and the other is multi-stage incentive model as contractors having fairness perceptions.Performance and evolution under different compensation structures are also analyzed by computational experiment. Results show that: Any compensation structure can not maintain it's efficiency when it is executed in multi-stage incentives; Compensation structure performing well in single-stage model can not keep good performance when applied to multi-stage incentive process; Individual fairness perception has negative influence on incentive performance; Every motivational factor in compensation structure has impact on incentive efficiency, and perfect incentive effect can not be achieved if cooperation among all incentive factors are ignored.

Key words: quality optimization, mass stimulation, compensation structure, computational experiment

中图分类号:

F830

李真, 孟庆峰, 盛昭瀚, 李迁. 工程质量优化的承包商群体激励效率演化分析 [J]. 中国管理科学, 2012, (3): 112-121.

LI Zhen, MENG Qing-Feng, SHENG Zhao-han, LI Qian. Analysis on Performance and Evolution of Mass Stimulation under Project Quality Optimization[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2012, (3): 112-121.

参考文献

[1] Vanhoucke M,Debels D. The discrete time/cost trade-off problem: extensions and heuristic procedures [J]. Journal of Scheduling, 2007,(10): 311-326.
[2] Eshtehardian E, Afshar A, Abbasnia R. Fuzzy-based MOGA approach to stochastic time-cost trade-off problem [J]. Automation in Construction, 2009, 18(5): 692-701.
[3] Pollack-Johnson B, Liberatore M J. Incorporating quality considerations Into project time/cost tradeoff analysis and decision making [J]. IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, 2006, 53(4): 534-542.
[4] Lam K C, Ng S T. A cooperative Internet-facilitated quality management environment for construction [J]. Automation in Construction, 2006, 15(1): 1-11.
[5] Chan W K L,Wong F K W, Scott D. Managing construction projects in China-the transitional period in the millennium[J]. International Journal of Project Management, 1999, 17(4): 257-263.
[6] Yung P, Lai L W C. Quality assurance in construction by independent experts: a case study of the efficiency performance of state-owned enterproses in china[J]. Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design, 2009, 36(4): 682- 697
[7] Chen Weitong,Chen T T. Critical Success factors for construction partnering in Taiwan[J]. International Journal of Project Management, 2007, 25(5): 475-484.
[8] Meng Xianhai. Assessment framework for construction supply chain relationships: development and evaluation[J]. International Journal of Project Management, 2010, 28(7): 695-707.
[9] von Branconi C,Loch C H. Contracting for major projects: eight business levers for top management [J]. International Journal of Project Management, 2004, 22(2): 119-130.
[10] 代建生, 孟卫东. 团队生产中的利益分享机制研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2010, 18(1): 120-127.
[11] Zheng D X M, Ng S T, Kumaraswamy M M. Applying a genetic algorithm-based multiobjective approach for time-cost optimization [J]. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 2004, 130(2): 168-176.
[12] Tareghian H R,Taheri H. An application of randomized minimum cut to the project time/cost tradeoff problem [J]. Applied Mathematics and Computation, 2006, 173(2): 1200-1207.
[13] 许婷. 工程项目采购供应链中的竞合博弈.中国管理科学, 2009, 17(1): 83-88.
[14] 陈建华, 马士华. 基于工期协调的项目公司与承包商收益激励模型 [J]. 中国管理科学, 2007, 15(3): 114-122.
[15] Itoh H. Moral hazard and other regarding preferences[J]. The Japanese Economic Review, 2004, 55(1): 18-25.
[16] Dur R, Glazer A. Optimal contracts when a worker envies his boss [J]. The Journal of Law, Economics & Organization, 2008, 24(1): 120-137.
[17] 盛昭瀚, 张军, 杜建国,等. 社会科学计算实验理论与应用 [M]. 上海:上海三联出版社, 2009.
[18] Crouch M. Investment under RPI-X: practical experience with an incentive compatible approach in the GB electricity distribution sector [J]. Utilities Policy, 2006, 14(4): 240-244.
[19] Robbins S P, Judge T A. 组织行为学 [M].李原, 孙健敏, 译. 北京: 中国人民大学出版社, 2008.
[20] Fehr E, Schmidt K M. A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation [J]. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1999, 114: 817-868.
[21] Merton R C. Optimum consumption and portfolio rules in a continuous-time model [J]. Journal of Economic Theory, 1971, 3(4): 373-413.
[22] Charness G,Kuhn P. Do co-workers’ wages matter? Theory and evidence on wage secrecy, wage compression and effort. IZA Discussion Paper, 2004.