战略性转移定价承诺策略与下游创新之间的交互影响研究

中国管理科学 ›› 2006, Vol. ›› Issue (1): 61-68.

战略性转移定价承诺策略与下游创新之间的交互影响研究

冯华¹, 马士华¹, 崔元锋²

1. 华中科技大学管理学院, 湖北, 武汉, 430074;
2. 中南财经政法大学工商学院, 湖北, 武汉, 430060

收稿日期:2005-04-15 修回日期:2005-12-14 出版日期:2006-02-28 发布日期:2012-03-07
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金重点资助项目(NSFC:70332001)

A Study on the Interaction between Strategic Transfer Pricing Commitment and Downstream Innovation

FENG Hua¹, MA Shi-hua¹, CUI Yuan-feng²

1. School of Management, Huazhong University of S & T, Wuhan 430074, China;
2. School of Business Management, Zhongnan University of E &L, Wuhan 430060, China

Received:2005-04-15 Revised:2005-12-14 Online:2006-02-28 Published:2012-03-07

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 以一个按照MTO模式运作,并且面临交货期-价格敏感性需求的“供应商-制造商”供应链为研究对象,对该供应链中上游供应商的战略性转移定价承诺与下游制造商创新之间的交互作用,以及这种交互作用对最优的交货期设定、转移定价决策,以及渠道内各合作伙伴的行为取向所产生的影响进行了初步探讨.通过分析发现,战略性转移定价承诺与下游创新之间的交互作用不会影响到最优的承诺交货期设定,但是,供应商实行完全地转移定价承诺策略将会激励制造商进行更多的投资创新活动.最后通过赋值分析对前文的理论研究进行了证实/伪.

关键词: 交货期敏感性需求, 创新, 转移定价, 交贷期

Abstract: This research examines the interaction between the strategic transfer pricing commitment and downstream innovation in a supplier-manufacturer channel,and its influences on the optimal quoted delivery time and investment decisions.We model the channel operation in a make-to-order fashion and treat the demand as being linear in price and quoted delivery time.We use this analysis to show that the interaction between full commitment and full flexibility has nothing to do with the optimal quoted delivery time,while with respect to the supplier,the manufacturer and the supply chain as a whole,full commitment is always dominating full commitment.Further,we study the robustness of optimal profit contributions when some of the model parameters are mis-estimated.

Key words: delivery time-sensitive demand, innovation, transfer pricing, delivery time

中图分类号:

F27
C931

冯华, 马士华, 崔元锋. 战略性转移定价承诺策略与下游创新之间的交互影响研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2006, (1): 61-68.

FENG Hua, MA Shi-hua, CUI Yuan-feng. A Study on the Interaction between Strategic Transfer Pricing Commitment and Downstream Innovation[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2006, (1): 61-68.

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