1 |
Monopoly Spence M., quality, and regulation [J]. Bell Journal of Economics, 1975(6): 417-429.
|
2 |
Zhang X H, Zhang J, Chen T Q. An ANP-fuzzy evaluation model of food quality safety supervision based on China's data[J]. Food Science & Nutrition, 2020, 8(7): 3157-3163.
|
3 |
Ling E K, Wahab S N. Integrity of food supply chain: going beyond food safety and food quality[J]. International Journal of Productivity and Quality Management, 2020, 29(2): 216.
|
4 |
Jia C H, Jukes D. The national food safety control system of China: a systematic review[J]. Food Control, 2013, 32(1): 236-245.
|
5 |
Zhang H F, Sun C Y, Huang L, et al. Does government intervention ensure food safety? Evidence from China[J]. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 2021, 18(7): 3645.
|
6 |
Mol A. Governing China's food quality through transparency: a review[J]. Food Control, 2014, 43: 49-56.
|
7 |
Li Y P, Wen D C, Sun X J. Quality supervision game between government and online shopping platforms[J]. Total Quality Management & Business Excellence, 2018, 29(9-10): 1246-1258.
|
8 |
孔庆山, 张芹, 杨蕙馨,等.企业集群产品质量监管演化与仿真研究[J].中国管理科学, 2020, 28(7): 174-183.
|
|
Kong Q S, Zhang Q, Yang H X, et al. The evolution and simulation of product quality supervision in enterprise clusters[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2020, 28(7): 174-183.
|
9 |
杨松, 庄晋财, 王爱峰. 惩罚机制下农产品质量安全投入演化博弈分析[J].中国管理科学, 2019, 27(8): 181-190.
|
|
Yang S, Zhuang J C, Wang A F. Evolutionary game of quality and safety investment of agricultural products under punishment mechanism[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2019, 27(8): 181-190.
|
10 |
赵荧梅, 郭本海,刘思峰.不完全信息下产品质量监管多方博弈模型[J].中国管理科学, 2017, 25(2): 111-120.
|
|
Zhao Y M, Guo B H, Liu S F. A multi-player game model about product quality regulation based on incomplete information[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2017, 25(2): 111-120.
|
11 |
于涛, 刘长玉. 政府与第三方在产品质量监管中的演化博弈分析及仿真研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2016, 24(6): 90-96.
|
|
Yu T, Liu C Y. The analysis of evolution game model and simulation between governments and the third-party in product quality regulation[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2016, 24(6): 90-96.
|
12 |
刘小鲁,李泓霖. 产品质量监管中的所有制偏倚[J]. 经济研究, 2015, 50(7): 146-159.
|
|
Liu X L, Li H L. Ownership distortions in product quality supervision[J]. Economic Research Journal, 2015, 50(7): 146-159.
|
13 |
Zhang M, Qiao H, Wang X, et al. The third-party regulation on food safety in China: a review[J]. Journal of Integrative Agriculture, 2015, 14(11): 2176-2188.
|
14 |
Brach S, Walsh G, Shaw D. Sustainable consumption and third-party certification labels: consumers' perceptions and reactions[J]. European Management Journal, 2017, 36(2): 254-265.
|
15 |
刘长玉, 于涛, 马英红. 基于产品质量监管视角的政府、企业与消费者博弈策略研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2019, 27(4): 127-135.
|
|
Liu C Y, Yu T, Ma Y H. Game of government, enterprise and consumer based on product quality regulation perspective[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2019, 27(4): 127-135.
|
16 |
Wang X, Xu Y C, Wang L, et al. Transmission of information about consumer product quality and safety: a social media perspective[J]. Information Discovery and Delivery, 2017, 45(1): 10-20.
|
17 |
朱立龙, 荣俊美,张思意. 政府奖惩机制下药品安全质量监管三方演化博弈及仿真分析[J]. 中国管理科学, 2021, 29(11):55-67.
|
|
Zhu L L, Rong J M, Zhang S Y. Three-party evolutionary game and simulation analysis of drug quality supervision under the government reward and punishment mechanism[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2021, 29(11):55-67.
|
18 |
Kampourakis I. Whistleblowers as regulatory intermediaries: instrumental and reflexive considerations in decentralizing regulation[J].Regulation & Governance, 2020, DOI: 10.1111/ rego.12361 .
doi: 10.1111/ rego.12361
|
19 |
Watson C, O'Connor T. Legislating for advocacy: the case of whistleblowing[J]. Nursing Ethics, 2017, 24(3): 305-312.
|
20 |
Schultz D, Harutyunyan K. Combati-ng corruption: The development of whistleblowing laws in the United States, Europe, and Armenia[J]. International Comparative Jurisprudence, 2015, 1(2): 87-97.
|
21 |
Alleyne P, Hudaib M, Pike R. Towards a conceptual model of whistle-blowing intentions among external auditors[J] The British Accounting Review, 2013, 45(1): 10-23.
|
22 |
Barkoukis V, Bondarev D, Lazuras L. Whistleblowing against doping in sport: a cross-national study on the effects of motivation and sports personship orientations on whistleblowing intentions[J]. Journal of Sports Sciences, 2020, 39(6):1-10.
|
23 |
Soon J, Manning L. Whistleblowing as a countermeasure strategy against food crime[J]. British Food Journal, 2017, 119(12): 2630-2652.
|
24 |
Moy G. The role of whistleblowers in protecting the safety and integrity of the food supply[J]. NPJ Science of Food, 2018, 2(1): 1-5.
|
25 |
周开国, 杨海生, 伍颖华. 食品安全监督机制研究——媒体、资本市场与政府协同治理[J].经济研究, 2016, 51(9): 58-72.
|
|
Zhou K G, Yang H S, Wu Y H. Research on collaborative food safety governance involving media, capital market and government[J]. Economic Research Journal, 2016, 51(9): 58-72.
|
26 |
Weinstein M. Lyapunov stability of ground states of nonlinear dispersive evolution equations[J]. Communications on Pure & Applied Mathematics, 1986, 39(1): 51-67.
|
27 |
Ritzberger K, Weibull W. Evolutionary selection in normal-form games[J]. Econometrica, 1995, 63(6): 1371-1399.
|
28 |
赵道致, 郝家芹, 杨洁, 等. 考虑平台网络外部性的分享经济中三方演化博弈分析[J]. 控制与决策, 2020, 35(7): 1741-1750.
|
|
Zhao D Z, Hao J Q, Yang J, et al. Evolutionary game analysis of three parties in sharing economy considering network externality of platform[J]. Control and Decision, 2020, 35(7): 1741-1750.
|
29 |
朱立龙, 荣俊美.“互联网+医疗健康”背景下考虑患者反馈机制的药品质量监管策略研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2020, 28(5): 122-135.
|
|
Zhu L L, Rong J M. Drug quality supervision strategy considering patient feedback mechanism under the background of “internet+medical health”[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2020, 28(5): 122-135.
|
30 |
曲薪池, 侯贵生, 孙向彦. 政府规制下企业绿色创新生态系统的演化博弈分析——基于初始意愿差异化视角[J]. 系统工程, 2019, 37(6): 1-12.
|
|
Qu X C, Hou G S, Sun X Y. Evolutionary game analysis of green innovation ecosystem of enterprises under government regulation: analysis from the perspective of initial willingness differentiation[J]. Systems Engineering, 2019, 37(6): 1-12.
|