考虑地区间环保投入策略互动的高质量发展研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.2191

中国管理科学 ›› 2022, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (3): 66-75.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.2191

考虑地区间环保投入策略互动的高质量发展研究

宋妍^1,3, 张明^2,3

1.西安电子科技大学经济与管理学院，陕西西安710126；2.中国矿业大学经济管理学院，江苏徐州221116；3.中国矿业大学环境经济与管理研究中心，江苏徐州221116

收稿日期:2020-09-14 修回日期:2020-12-11 出版日期:2022-03-19 发布日期:2022-03-19
通讯作者: 张明(1980-)，男(汉族)，山东博兴人，中国矿业大学经济管理学院，教授，博士生导师，研究方向：资源环境与生态管理，Email：zhangmingdlut@163.com. E-mail:zhangmingdlut@163.com
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(72173094，72174195，71874189)；江苏省社会科学基金资助项目(20JD012)；江苏省“六大人才高峰”高层次人才培养资助项目(JNHB-081)

Research on High-quality Development Considering Inter Regional Environmental Investment Strategy Interaction

SONG Yan^1,3, ZHANG Ming^2,3

1. School of Economics and Management, Xidian University, Xi’an 710126, China; 2. School of Economics and Management, China University of Mining and Technology, Xuzhou 221116, China; 3. Center for Environmental Management and Economics Policy Research, China University of Mining and Technology, Xuzhou 221116, China

Received:2020-09-14 Revised:2020-12-11 Online:2022-03-19 Published:2022-03-19
Contact: 张明 E-mail:zhangmingdlut@163.com

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 在考虑地区环保投入具有策略互动特征的基础上，模型分析了禀赋和财政能力差异对地方政府政策目标的影响，并讨论了平衡地区资源禀赋的生态转移支付政策对地区间环保联合产出水平的影响。研究结果表明：地区间环保投入策略互动特征的引入，使得环保联合产出最大化对应于适度的地方政府资源禀赋差异程度，差异程度过大或者过于平均，都不利于激发地方政府活力，为高质量的经济持续发展提供稳定条件。此外，专项转移支付政策相比于总量转移支付政策，能够更有效地激励地方政府在生态环境方面投入努力；而减少专项转移支付在实践中的信息对称要求，建立市场化运作资金池的横向转移支付制度安排是进一步加大地区环保投入水平的可行政策。从协调地区经济发展差异、确保环保投入发挥成效，测度地区生态外溢效应、优化专项转移支付政策，建立市场化运作资金池、提升横向转移支付占比等方面，提出提升我国环保投入资金使用效率的对策建议。

关键词: 高质量发展；环保投入；策略互动；异质性；转移支付

Abstract: On the basis of considering the strategic interaction characteristics of regional environmental protection investment, a model is established to analyze the impact of endowment and financial capacity differences on the policy objectives of local governments, and the impact of ecological transfer payment policy balancing regional resource endowment on the regional environmental protection joint output level is discussed. The results show that: the introduction of strategic interaction characteristics of regional environmental protection investment can maximize the joint output of environmental protection, corresponding to the moderate difference degree of local government resource endowment. The difference degree is too large or too average, which is not conducive to stimulate the vitality of local governments, and provides stable conditions for high-quality economic sustainable development. In addition, compared with the lump-sum transfer payment policy, the earmarked transfer payment policy can more effectively encourage the local governments to invest in the ecological environment; reducing the information symmetry requirements of the earmarked transfer payment in practice and establishing the horizontal transfer payment based on market-oriented operation fund pool are feasible policies to further increase the regional environmental protection level. From the aspects of coordinating regional economic development differences, ensuring the effectiveness of environmental protection investment, measuring the regional ecological spillover effect, optimizing the earmarked transfer payment policy, establishing market-oriented operation fund pool and increasing the proportion of horizontal transfer payment, countermeasures and suggestions are put forward to improve the utilization efficiency of environmental protection investment funds in China.

Key words: high-quality development; environmental protection investment; strategic interaction; heterogeneity; transfer payment

中图分类号:

F291.1

宋妍, 张明. 考虑地区间环保投入策略互动的高质量发展研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2022, 30(3): 66-75.

SONG Yan, ZHANG Ming. Research on High-quality Development Considering Inter Regional Environmental Investment Strategy Interaction[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2022, 30(3): 66-75.

参考文献

［1］尹振东, 聂辉华. 腐败、官员治理与经济发展［J］. 经济学(季刊), 2020, 19(2): 411-432.Yin Zhendong, Nie Huihua. Corruption, officials governance and economic development［J］. China Economic Quarterly, 2020, 19(2): 411-432.
［2］哈耶克. 哈耶克文选［M］. 冯克利. 郑州: 河南大学出版社, 2015.Hayek F A. Hayek Selections［M］. Feng Keli. Zhengzhou: Henan University Press, 2015.
［3］宋妍, 陈赛, 张明. 地方政府异质性与区域环境合作治理——基于中国式分权的演化博弈分析［J］. 中国管理科学, 2020, 28(1): 201-211.Song Yan, Chen Sai, Zhang Ming. Local government heterogeneity and regional environmental cooperation: Evolutionary game analysis based on Chinese decentralization［J］. Chinese Journal of Management Scinece, 2020, 28(1): 201-211.
［4］ Solé-Ollé O. Expenditure spillovers and fiscal interactions: Empirical evidence from local governments in Spain［J］. Journal of Urban Economics, 2006, 59(1): 32-53.
［5］ Wang Jia. Strategic interaction and economic development incentives policy: Evidence from U.S. States［J］. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 2018, 66: 249-259.
［6］张可, 汪东芳, 周海燕. 地区间环保投入与污染排放的内生策略互动［J］. 中国工业经济, 2016(2): 68-82.Zhang Ke, Wang Dongfang, Zhou Haiyan. Regional endogenetic strategic interaction of environmental protection investment and emission［J］. China Industrial Economics, 2016(2): 68-82.
［7］ Chen Sai, Song Yan, Ding Yueting, et al. Research on the strategic interaction and convergence of China’s environmental public expenditure from the perspective of inequality［J］. Resources, Conservation & Recycling, 2019, 145: 19-30.
［8］ Peng Xin. Strategic interaction of environmental regulation and green productivity growth in China: Green innovation or pollution refuge?［J］. Science of The Total Environment. 2020, DOI: 10.1016/j.scitotenv.2020.139200.
［9］朱军, 许志伟. 财政分权、地区间竞争与中国经济波动［J］. 经济研究, 2018(1): 21-34.Zhu Jun, Xu Zhiwei. Fiscal decentralization, regional fiscal competition and macroeconomic fluctuations in China［J］. Economic Research Journal, 2018(1): 21-34.
［10］曹鸿杰, 卢洪友, 潘星宇. 地方政府环境支出行为的空间策略互动研究——传导机制与再检验［J］. 经济理论与经济管理, 2020(1): 55-68.Cao Hongjie, Lu Hongyou, Pan Xingyu. Spatial strategy interaction of local government environmental public expenditures behavior: Transmission mechanism and reexaminations［J］. Economic Theory and Business Management, 2020(1): 55-68.
［11］韩超, 张伟广, 单双. 规制治理、公众诉求与环境污染——基于地区间环境治理策略互动的经验分析［J］. 财贸经济, 2016, 37(9): 144-161.Han Chao, Zhang Guangwei, Shan Shuang. Regulatory governance, public appeal and environmental pollution: Based on strategic interaction of environmental governance［J］. Finance & Trade Economics, 2016, 37(9): 144-161.
［12］张彩云, 苏丹妮, 卢玲, 等. 政绩考核与环境治理——基于地方政府间策略互动的视角［J］. 财经研究, 2018, 44(5): 4-22.Zhang Caiyun, Su Danni, Lu Ling, et al. Performance evaluation and environmental governance: From a perspective of strategic interaction between local governments［J］. Journal of Finance and Economics, 2018, 44(5): 4-22.
［13］马海涛, 师玉朋. 三级分权、支出偏好与雾霾治理的机理——基于中国式财政分权的博弈分析［J］. 当代财经, 2016(8): 24-32.Ma Haitao, Shi Yupeng. Three-level fiscal decentralization, expenditure preferences and haze governance mechanism: Based on a game model analysis of Chinese-style fiscal decentralization［J］. Contemporary Finance & Economics, 2016(8): 24-32.
［14］陈建宝, 乔宁宁. 地方利益主体博弈下的资源禀赋与公共品供给［J］. 经济学(季刊), 2016, 15(2): 693-722.Chen Jianbao, Qiao Ningning. Resource endowment and public goods supply under the game of local interests subject［J］. China Economic Quarterly, 2016, 15(2): 693-722.
［15］ Bergstrom T C, Blume L, Varian H. On the private provision of public goods［J］. Journal of Public Economics, 1986, 29(1): 25-49.
［16］ Forbes K J. A reassessment of the relationship between inequality and growth［J］. American Economic Review, 2000, 90(4): 869-887.
［17］ Naidu S C. Heterogeneity and collective management: Evidence from common forests in Himachal Pradesh, India［J］. World Development, 2009, 37(3): 676-686.
［18］ Cornes R C, Silva E C D. Local public goods, inter-regional transfers and private information［J］. European Economic Review, 2002, 46: 329-356.
［19］ Buchholz W, Cornes R, Rübbelke D. Public goods and public bads［J］. Journalof Public Economic Theory, 2018, 20(4):525-540.
［20］周广肃, 张牧扬, 樊纲. 地方官员任职经历、公共转移支付与居民消费不平等［J］. 经济学(季刊), 2019, 19(1): 61-80.Zhou Guangsu, Zhang Muyang, Fan Gang. Career background, public transfer and consumption inequality［J］. China Economic Quarterly, 2019, 19(1): 61-80.
［21］ Sauquet A, Marchand S, Feres J G. Protected areas, local governments, and strategic interactions: The case of the ICMS-Ecológico in the Brazilian state of Paraná［J］. Ecological Economics, 2014, 107: 249-258.
［22］李国平, 刘生胜. 中国生态补偿40年: 政策演进与理论逻辑［J］. 西安交通大学学报(社会科学版), 2018, 38(6): 101-112.Li Guoping, Liu Shengsheng. 40 Years of ecological compensation in China: Policy evolution and theoretical logic［J］. Journal of Xi’an JiaotongUniversity(Social Sciences), 2018, 38(6): 101-112.
［23］任丙强. 地方政府环境政策执行的激励机制研究: 基于中央与地方关系的视角［J］. 中国行政管理, 2018(6): 129-135.Ren Bingqiang. The incentive mechanisms of local environmental policy implementation: From the perspective of central-local relations［J］. Chinese Public Administration, 2018(6): 129-135.
［24］缪小林, 赵一心. 生态功能区转移支付对生态环境改善的影响: 资金补偿还是制度激励?［J］. 财政研究, 2019(5): 17-32.Miao Xiaolin, Zhao Yixin. Impact of transfer payment in eco-functional areas on eco-environmental improvement: Capital compensation or institutional incentives?［J］. Public Finance Research, 2019(5): 17-32.
［25］曹鸿杰, 卢洪友, 祁毓. 分权对国家重点生态功能区转移支付政策效果的影响研究［J］. 财经论丛, 2020(5): 21-31.Cao Hongjie, Lu Hongyou, Qi Yu. Study on the impact of decentralization on the effect of transfer payments of national key ecological function areas［J］. Collected Essays On Finance and Economics, 2020(5): 21-31.
［26］徐松鹤, 韩传峰. 基于微分博弈的流域生态补偿机制研究［J］. 中国管理科学, 2019, 27(8): 199-207.Xu Songhe, Han Chuanfeng. Study on basin ecological compensation mechanism based on differential game theory［J］. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2019, 27(8): 199-207.
［27］吕冰洋, 毛捷, 马光荣. 分税与转移支付结构: 专项转移支付为什么越来越多？［J］. 管理世界, 2018(4): 25-39, 187.Lv Bingyang, Mao Jie, Ma Guangrong. Tax sharing and intergovernmental transfers structure: Why do the earmarked transfers keep growing?［J］. Management World, 2018(4): 25-39, 187.
［28］贾晓俊, 岳希明, 王怡璞. 分类拨款、地方政府支出与基本公共服务均等化——兼谈我国转移支付制度改革［J］. 财贸经济, 2015, (4): 5-16, 133.Jia Junxiu, Yue Ximing, Wang Yipu. Block grants, local expenditures and equalization of basic public services: An implication for the reform of transfer payments［J］. Finance & Trade Economics, 2015, (4): 5-16, 133.

考虑地区间环保投入策略互动的高质量发展研究

Research on High-quality Development Considering Inter Regional Environmental Investment Strategy Interaction

PDF (PC)

可视化

摘要/Abstract

引用本文

使用本文

参考文献

相关文章 0

Metrics

本文评价

推荐阅读 10