基于产品责任的零售商主导供应链质量成本分担合同研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.1493

中国管理科学 ›› 2023, Vol. 31 ›› Issue (5): 187-197.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.1493

• 论文 • 上一篇

基于产品责任的零售商主导供应链质量成本分担合同研究

范建昌¹, 付红², 洪定军³, 万娜娜⁴

1.南京财经大学营销与物流管理学院，江苏南京210023；2.合肥工业大学管理学院，安徽合肥230009；3.九江学院经济与管理学院，江西九江332005；4.西南科技大学经济管理学院,四川绵阳621010

收稿日期:2020-08-03 修回日期:2021-01-10 发布日期:2023-05-23
通讯作者: 范建昌(1987-)，男(汉族)，江西丰城人，南京财经大学营销与物流管理学院，讲师，博士，研究方向：供应链管理，Email: love.andyfan@163.com. E-mail:love.andyfan@163.com
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(72002094，71802168，71972026，71761020)；教育部人文社会科学研究资助项目(20YJC630020，18YJC630165)

The Research on the Quality Cost Sharing Contract in the Retailer-led Supply Chain Based on Product Liability

FAN Jian-chang¹, FU Hong², HONG Ding-jun³, WAN Na-na⁴

1. School of Marketing and Logistics Management, Nanjing University of Finance & Economics, Nanjing 210023, China; 2. School of Management, Hefei University of Technology, Hefei 230009, China; 3. School of Management and Economics, Jiujiang University, Jiujiang 332005, China; 4. School of Economics and Management, Southwest University of Science and Technology, Mianyang 621010, China

Received:2020-08-03 Revised:2021-01-10 Published:2023-05-23
Contact: 范建昌 E-mail:love.andyfan@163.com

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 基于以零售商为主导的两级供应链，在供应商产品质量缺陷对消费者造成效用损失，并导致零售商承担产品责任的情形下，考虑了如何设计质量成本分担合同以激励产品质量水平的提升。基于此，考虑了两种质量成本分担比例(合同)决策模式(即零售商决策和纳什讨价还价决策)，构建了供应链动态博弈模型，考察了责任成本对供应链质量决策和企业利润的影响机理，并揭示了不同质量成本分担比例决策模式对供应链均衡结果差异的策略性机理。结果表明：(1)在分散化下，当供应商质量投资效率较高(较低)时，其产品质量随责任成本的增加而增加(减小);而在质量成本分担合同下，随着责任成本的增加，最优质量成本分担比例随之增加，而产品质量随之先提高后降低。(2)质量成本分担有助于产品质量、零售商利润和供应链系统利润的提高，而供应商利润在纳什讨价还价决策模式下将提高，但在零售商决策模式下，当责任成本较小时其反而将降低。(3)相对于零售商决策模式而言，在纳什讨价还价决策模式下，最优质量成本分担比例、产品质量和零售商利润均相对较低，但供应商利润和供应链系统利润均相对较高。

关键词: 供应链；产品责任；质量；成本分担

Abstract: Product safety issues caused by low-quality products have become a major issue in supply chain operation management. Product safety incidents have been frequent in recent years. For example, in 2006, Dell recalled nearly 4.1 million Sony Corp notebook computer batteries that could catch fire, costing Dell more than 400 million dollars. In 2007, Tesla was forced to recall more than 50,000 Model X vehicles due to a faulty design in its supplier BremboSpA’s parking brake system. This recall has also resulted in a huge loss in Tesla’s market value. These cases reveal that a downstream firm that dominates the supply chain often bears product liability for product safety events caused by quality defects in a component made by its upstream suppliers. Therefore, it has become a crucial problem for the core downstream firm in the supply chain to design an effective incentive contract to motivate upstream suppliers to improve the quality level and reduce the increased liability costs.

Key words: supply chain; product liability; quality; cost sharing

中图分类号:

F270

范建昌, 付红, 洪定军, 万娜娜. 基于产品责任的零售商主导供应链质量成本分担合同研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2023, 31(5): 187-197.

FAN Jian-chang, FU Hong, HONG Ding-jun, WAN Na-na. The Research on the Quality Cost Sharing Contract in the Retailer-led Supply Chain Based on Product Liability[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2023, 31(5): 187-197.

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基于产品责任的零售商主导供应链质量成本分担合同研究

The Research on the Quality Cost Sharing Contract in the Retailer-led Supply Chain Based on Product Liability

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