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中国管理科学 ›› 2021, Vol. 29 ›› Issue (12): 168-178.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.0871

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

非线性技术演化条件下的专利研发投资决策研究

翟东升, 李梦洋, 何喜军, 徐硕   

  1. 北京工业大学经济与管理学院,北京100124
  • 收稿日期:2020-05-15 修回日期:2020-09-21 发布日期:2021-12-28
  • 通讯作者: 李梦洋(1988-),男(汉族),辽宁锦州人,北京工业大学经济与管理学院,博士研究生,研究方向:技术投资与知识产权运营,Email:lmy8869@126.com. E-mail:lmy8869@126.com
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助面上项目(71974009)

Research on R&D Investment of Patent under Nonlinear Technology Evolution

ZHAI Dong-sheng, LI Meng-yang, HE Xi-jun, XU Shuo   

  1. School of Economics and Management, Beijing University of Technology, Beijing 100124, China
  • Received:2020-05-15 Revised:2020-09-21 Published:2021-12-28
  • Contact: 李梦洋 E-mail:lmy8869@126.com

摘要: 本文将基于TRIZ理论的非线性技术演化规律引入到专利研发投资的期权博弈模型中,分别在完全垄断市场和双寡头竞争市场条件下,讨论了受技术演化影响时企业所蕴含的实物期权特征,并基于博弈均衡分析了企业于技术演化时间轴上进行专利研发投资的最优投资时机选择和面对具有不同投资风险技术时的应对方案。研究结果表明:在非线性技术演化条件下,完全垄断市场中的企业投资临界值会随技术发展下降,进而促使企业对高技术风险专利展开提前投资;在双寡头竞争市场中,企业会为争当领导者而选择放弃其期权价值,将投资提前至专利价值较低的技术发展初期执行,形成非帕累托最优的同时投资均衡;此外,企业会对高风险高收益的技术呈现优先投资的偏好。本文的结论能够在一定程度上解释企业在技术发展初期就进行高额研发投资的动机,以及技术自身属性如何对投资决策造成的影响,可以为现实中企业在面临类似投资问题时做出理性决策提供参考。

关键词: 非线性技术演化;专利研发投资;期权博弈;TRIZ理论

Abstract: In recent years, the increasingly fierce technology competition in the high-tech industry makes the investment environment of the patent market more complex. However, due to the lack of careful consideration of technical factors, previous scholars’ researches on R&D investment of patent and other patent trading behaviors are difficult to provide a good description of the technical uncertainty and R&D risk for the existing patent investment market.Therefore, the non-linear technology evolution law based on TRIZ theory is introduced into the option game model of patent R&D investment. First, three time-varying functions as model hypotheses based on the description of the non-linear technology evolution law are proposed, which separately characterize the influence of technical uncertainty, R&D risk, and profitability on investment with technology development. Then, the enterprise value functions for the monopoly market and the duopoly market are reconstructed, the real option characteristics of the enterprise under the influence of technology evolution are analyzed, and the optimal timing of the patent R&D investment of enterprises on the timeline of technology evolution and their reactions to technologies with different investment risks are studied through game equilibrium analysis. The results show that: under the condition of non-linear technology evolution, the critical value of enterprises investing in a monopoly market will decrease with the development of technology, which will prompt enterprises to invest in patents with high technological risks in advance; in the duopoly competitive market, enterprises will choose to abandon its option value to be the leader, advance their investment to the early stage of technology development with lower patent value, and form a non-Pareto optimal simultaneous investment balance; besides, enterprises maybe show the preference for investment on technology with high-risk and high-profitability. The conclusion of this paper explains the motivation of current high-tech enterprises to make high R&D investments in the early stage of technology development, discusses how the nature of technology affects investment decisions, and provides suggestions for enterprises facing similar investment problems in reality.

Key words: non-linear technology evolution; R&D investment of patent; option game; TRIZ theory

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