COVID-19疫情下医疗防护用品市场监管演化博弈与稳定性分析

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.0448

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 新冠肺炎(COVID-19)疫情爆发，口罩等医疗防护用品成为硬通货，部分企业出现哄抬物价、制售假货等乱象行为增加了疫情防控工作的实施难度。为了探讨医疗防护用品市场监管动态机制，文章在地方政府—防护用品企业—消费者三方静态演化博弈模型基础上，依次引入动态惩罚、动态惩罚—补贴方案，通过系统动力学仿真分析了不同机制下各演化均衡解的稳定情况，并基于李雅普诺夫稳定性定理验证了演化稳定均衡点。研究表明：完全静态机制下，三个博弈主体的博弈过程无法趋向稳定均衡状态。引入动态惩罚、补贴等手段能够较好抑制博弈主体的行为策略波动，使得防护用具企业诚信经营成为较优选择。同时，提出了一种新型的非线性动态惩罚—补贴机制，在该机制下激励效果最佳。本研究为疫情形势下地方政府设计合理规范医疗防护用品市场方案提供一定思路。

关键词: COVID-19;医疗防护用品;演化博弈;系统动力学;动态机制

Abstract: The outbreak of COVID-19 has led to a surge in the demand for medical protective equipment such as masks. Some enterprises have engaged in disorderly behaviors such as price gouging and manufacturing and selling fake goods, which have made the prevention and control of the epidemic more difficult. At this time, the government is needed to supervise the market. It is necessary to design a practical solution that can stabilize the market order in the shortest time. In order to discuss the dynamic mechanism of medical protective equipment market supervision, a three-agent static evolutionary game among local government, protective equipment company, and consumer is established. Through the sensitivity analysis, it is found that the sensitivity index of each key parameter is less than 1, and the model has good robustness. Based on static evolutionary game model, a dynamic penalty model and a dynamic penalty-subsidy model are constructed in order. System dynamics is used to simulate the stability of each evolutionary equilibrium solution under different mechanisms, and Lyapunov's stability theorem is used to verify the equilibrium point of evolutionary stability. The results show that: (1) under a completely static mechanism, the game process of the three game players cannot reach a stable equilibrium state. (2)The introduction of dynamic punishment, subsidies and other methods can better suppress the behavioral fluctuations of the game subject, and urge protective equipment companies to take honest management as their better choice. (3) A new type of non-linear dynamic penalty-subsidy mechanism is proposed, under which the incentive effect is the best. And the protective equipment enterprise reaches the ideal stable situation on the fifth day. Some ideas for local governments are provided to design a reasonable and standardized medical protective equipment market plan under the COVID-19 epidemic situation.

Key words: COVID-19; medical protective equipment; evolutionary game; system dynamics; dynamic mechanism

中图分类号:

F203

梁雁茹, 刘亦晴. COVID-19疫情下医疗防护用品市场监管演化博弈与稳定性分析[J]. 中国管理科学, 2022, 30(10): 85-95.

LIANG Yan-ru, LIU Yi-qing. The Evolutionary Game and Stability of the Regulatory Mechanism of Medical Protective Equipment Market under COVID-19 Epidemic[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2022, 30(10): 85-95.

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