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中国管理科学 ›› 2022, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (11): 352-360.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.2180

• 论文 • 上一篇    

考虑信息平台优化的医疗服务系统决策研究

胡东滨, 黄森龙   

  1. 中南大学商学院,湖南 长沙410083
  • 收稿日期:2019-12-31 修回日期:2022-03-15 出版日期:2022-11-20 发布日期:2022-11-28
  • 通讯作者: 黄森龙(1991-), 男(汉族),福建泉州人,中南大学商学院,博士研究生,研究方向:医疗运作管理,Email:huangsl2021@petalmail.com. E-mail:huangsl2021@petalmail.com
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目(91846301)

Research on Decision-Making of Medical Service System Considering Information Platform Optimization

HU Dong-bin, HUANG Sen-long   

  1. 1. Business School, Chengdu University of Technology, Chengdu 610059, China;2. School of Finance, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, Kunming 650221, China;3. School of Economics and Management, Southeast University, Nanjing 211189, China
  • Received:2019-12-31 Revised:2022-03-15 Online:2022-11-20 Published:2022-11-28
  • Contact: 黄森龙 E-mail:huangsl2021@petalmail.com

摘要: 微信、支付宝等手机应用上预约挂号和智能分诊的实现,实质上是信息平台优化。而信息平台优化投入对患者就医偏好的影响具有不确定性。通过分析信息平台优化投入对患者就诊选择影响,本文构建了考虑信息平台优化的医疗服务系统。与以往研究不同的是,系统中的期望等待时间为更精确的等待队列等待时间。另外,服务提供者的最优化决策变量创新地由医疗服务能力转为信息平台优化的投入,同时资金提供者的决策目标为最小化社会医疗成本。本文研究了医疗服务系统的均衡策略与均衡状态的性质。其次,对不同医疗服务规模的医疗服务系统的均衡状态进行了对比。研究发现,对于公共医疗系统,信息平台优化的最优投入与患者自付率无关,而这有助于实现基本医疗服务均等化。本文从数理上证明了,在均衡状态下,当患者的医疗需要增加时,划拨到公立医院的预算会减少。患者自付率与医疗服务的复杂度无关,即患者负担的医疗费用与医疗服务的复杂度无关。

关键词: 信息平台优化;等待队列等待时间;排队博弈;公共医疗预算;患者自付率

Abstract: The realization of appointment registration and intelligent triage on Wechat, Alipay and other mobile apps is essentially the optimization of information platform. The optimization of information platform may cause unreasonable increase of medical expenses. By analyzing the influence of information platform optimization input on patients’ choice, a medical service system considering information platform optimization is constructed. Different from previous studies, the expected waiting time in the system is more accurate waiting time in the waiting queue. In addition, the optimization decision variable of service provider innovatively changes from medical service capability to input of information platform optimization, and the decision goal of capital provider is to minimize social medical cost. The equilibrium strategy and the properties of equilibrium state of medical service system are studied. The equilibrium state of medical service system with different medical service scale is compared. It is found that for the public medical system, the optimal input of information platform optimization is uncorrelated with the patient co-payment rate, which is helpful to realize the equalization of basic medical services. Secondly, it is mathematically proved that in equilibrium, when patients’ medical needs increase, the budget allocated to public hospitals will decrease. Finally, the patient co-payment rate is not related to the complexity of medical services, that is, the medical costs borne by patients are not related to the complexity of medical services. These management insights will help public hospital managers to better optimize the medical information platform, and also help the government to make more reasonable decisions to prevent the unreasonable increase of medical costs.

Key words: information platform optimizing; waiting time of wait queue; queuing game; public medical budget; patient co-payment rate

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