考虑决策者期望的企业R&D项目投资路径演化博弈研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.0378

中国管理科学 ›› 2021, Vol. 29 ›› Issue (8): 116-125.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.0378

考虑决策者期望的企业R&D项目投资路径演化博弈研究

王超发, 蔡鑫, 杨德林

1. 西安电子科技大学经济与管理学院, 陕西西安 710126;
2. 深圳大学经济学院, 广东深圳 518060;
3. 清华大学经济管理学院, 北京 100084

收稿日期:2019-03-19 修回日期:2019-06-24 出版日期:2021-08-20 发布日期:2021-08-13
通讯作者: 王超发(1986-),男(汉族),陕西咸阳人,西安电子科技大学经济与管理学院,副教授,博士,研究方向:企业风险管理,E-mail:jiewangxjtu@outlook.com. E-mail:jiewangxjtu@outlook.com
基金资助:
国家重点研发计划课题（2017YFB1402001）；国家社会科学基金重大资助项目（17ZDA051）；国家自然科学基金青年资助项目（72002163）；陕西省社会科学基金资助项目（2020R017）

Study on Evolution Game of Enterprise R&D Project Investment Path in Consideration of Decision Maker's Expectation

WANG Chao-fa, CAI Xin, YANG De-lin

1. School of Economics and Management, Xidian University, Xi'an 710126, China;
2. School of Economics, Shenzhen University, Shenzhen 518060, China;
3. School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China

Received:2019-03-19 Revised:2019-06-24 Online:2021-08-20 Published:2021-08-13

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 企业在对R&D项目投资时的路径选择行为受到决策者期望的影响。本研究在分析R&D项目投资路径及其决策者期望的基础上，根据政治关联性将企业分为国有企业和民营企业，构建了考虑决策者期望的企业R&D项目投资路径演化博弈模型。研究表明：民营企业是否选择最优路径的策略影响着演化均衡；对民营企业来说，初始投资额差异对该类企业选择最优路径的概率的影响完全一致；乐观决策者的数量、群体规模、决策者期望差异和初始阶段的投资额差异对两类企业选择最优路径的概率的影响程度不同。影响国有企业和民营企业路径选择的主要因素是乐观决策者的数量、期望差异和初始阶段投资额差异。以上结论有助于企业和政府更好地进行管理策略实施。

关键词: 决策者期望, R&D项目, 投资路径, 演化博弈

Abstract: The path choice behavior of enterprises in the investment of R&D projects is affected by the decision-maker's expectation. Based on the analysis of the investment path of R&D project and decision-maker's expectation, the enterprises are divided into state-owned enterprises and private enterprises according to the political relevance, and an evolutionary game model of the investment path considering decision-maker's expectation is built. The results show that whether private enterprises choose the optimal path affects the evolutionary equilibrium; For private enterprises, the difference of initial investment has exactly the same influence on the probability of choosing the optimal path. The number of optimistic decision-makers, the group size, the difference of decision-makers' expectation and the difference of initial investment have different effects on the probability of choosing the optimal path of the two types of firms. The main factors that influence the path choice of state-owned enterprises and private enterprises are the number of optimistic decision-makers, the difference of expectations and the difference of initial investment. The above conclusions are helpful for enterprises and governments to implement management strategies better.

Key words: decision maker’s expectations, R&D projects, investment path, evolutionary game

中图分类号:

F830

王超发, 蔡鑫, 杨德林. 考虑决策者期望的企业R&D项目投资路径演化博弈研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2021, 29(8): 116-125.

WANG Chao-fa, CAI Xin, YANG De-lin. Study on Evolution Game of Enterprise R&D Project Investment Path in Consideration of Decision Maker's Expectation[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2021, 29(8): 116-125.

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考虑决策者期望的企业R&D项目投资路径演化博弈研究

Study on Evolution Game of Enterprise R&D Project Investment Path in Consideration of Decision Maker's Expectation

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